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Fault management is one of the key parts of the network operation process, especially 
for rural Distribution System Operators. Efficient fault management is highly dependent 
on the Network Control Center and the operators that are responsible for the network. 
One of the most important tools used in fault management is the Distribution Manage-
ment System and therefore it is vital that it offers adequate features to manage the dif-
ferent fault situations. Developing these tools and ensuring that they are compliant with 
the requirements and needs of the customers requires interaction with the DSOs. The 
main objectives of this thesis were to gather the most recent development ideas and re-
quirements from Finnish DSOs, regarding ABB MicroSCADA Pro DMS600 and to 
provide implementation specifications for the most important ones. One of the objec-
tives was also to describe the fault management processes and analyse the current fault 
management features of the system by simulating actual faults. 
The fault simulations were carried out in a replicated environment of a certain DMS600 
customer and they focused mainly on testing the automatic fault isolation and restora-
tion feature and the fault location function that is closely related to it. According to the 
simulations, fault locations are rarely available and therefore the current automatic fault 
isolation and restoration feature is not feasible, although the switching sequences gener-
ated were mostly correct. Thus, no significant monetary benefits can currently be ex-
pected from the use of the feature but, according to the simulation results, a new auto-
matic fault isolation and restoration feature with a redesigned logic could provide con-
siderable reductions in the annual KAH-value. The main part of this thesis, the customer 
interviews, were carried out by interviewing three largest DMS600 customers. A semi-
structured interview method was used and a basic structure for the interviews was pro-
vided but mostly the interviews consisted of open discussion. Numerous development 
ideas and requirements were presented in the interviews. The most important ones were 
the new automatic fault isolation and restoration feature and the new fault prioritization 
tool. This thesis also describes the fault management processes of the interviewed 
DSOs. The final part of this thesis provides specifications for the new fault prioritiza-
tion tool and an automatic fault reporting feature that were chosen for implementation 
analysis. Future developments, regarding e.g. the new automatic fault isolation and res-
toration feature and some other minor, but viable additions and changes were also intro-
duced in the final part of this thesis. 
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Vianhallinta on tärkeä osa verkon käyttötoimintaa, etenkin sähköverkkoyhtiöille, jotka 
toimivat haja-asutusalueilla. Tehokas vianhallinta on vahvasti yhteydessä käyttökeskuk-
sen ja sitä hallinnoivien verkko-operaattorien toimintaan vikatilanteessa. Eräs tärkeim-
mistä operaattorien käyttämistä työkaluista vianhallinnan aikana on käytöntukijärjes-
telmä ja siksi on tärkeää, että se tarjoaa asianmukaiset toiminnot kuhunkin vikatilantee-
seen. Asiakkaiden tarpeita vastaavien vianhallintatoimintojen kehittäminen vaatii kui-
tenkin vuorovaikutusta sähköverkkoyhtiöiden kanssa. Tämän työn tärkeimpänä tavoit-
teena olikin kerätä viimeisimmät vaatimukset ja kehityskohteet vianhallinnalle ABB 
MicroSCADA Pro DMS600 –käytöntukijärjestelmässä sekä luoda tarkemmat määritte-
lyt tärkeimmille uusille ominaisuuksille, jotka implementoidaan järjestelmään lähiai-
koina. Työn tavoitteena oli myös kuvata DMS600-asiakkaiden vianhallintaprosessit ja 
analysoida järjestelmään jo sisältyviä vianhallintatoimintoja simuloimalla todellisia ja-
keluverkon vikoja. 
Vikasimuloinnit toteutettiin erään DMS600-asiakkaan kopioidussa ympäristössä ja ne 
keskittyivät pääasiassa automaattisen jakelunpalautussekvenssin sekä siihen vahvasti 
liittyvän vianpaikannustoiminnon testaukseen. Simulointien perusteella viat pystytään 
harvoin paikantamaan sillä tarkkuudella, että nykyistä jakelunpalautussekvenssiä pys-
tyttäisiin käyttämään, vaikkakin järjestelmän luomat kytkentäsekvenssit olivat enim-
mäkseen käyttökelpoisia. Tästä johtuen merkittäviä rahallisia hyötyjä ei voida saavuttaa 
nykyisen toiminnon avulla, mutta uusi, erilaiseen toimintalogiikkaan perustuva auto-
maattinen vianrajaustoiminto sen sijaan voisi mahdollistaa varteenotettavat säästöt säh-
köverkkoyhtiöiden vuosittaisessa KAH-kertymässä. Työn ydinosa koostuu asiakashaas-
tatteluista ja niiden pohjalta luoduista uusien ominaisuuksien määrittelyistä. Haastattelu-
jen toteuttamiseksi työn aikana vierailtiin kolmen suurimman DMS600-asiakkaan luona 
ja menetelmänä käytettiin teemahaastattelua, jossa haastattelun perusrakenne oli laadittu 
etukäteen, mutta keskustelu tilaisuuden aikana oli muuten avointa. Haastattelujen tulok-
sena saatiin useita kehityskohteita, joista tärkeimpinä esille nousivat uusi vianrajaustoi-
minto sekä vikojen priorisointityökalu. Lisäksi työssä kuvattiin myös haastateltujen asi-
akkaiden vianhallintaprosessit. Työn viimeisessä osuudessa luotiin määrittelyt uudelle 
vikojen priorisointityökalulle sekä automaattiselle vikaraportointitoiminnolle, jotka va-
littiin tarkempaan tarkasteluun implementointia varten. Lisäksi työn viimeisessä osassa 
esiteltiin asiakashaastatteluihin ja simulointeihin perustuen toteuttamiskelpoisimmat 
jatkokehitystarpeet vianhallinnalle, joista tärkeimmäksi nähtiin uusi vianrajaustoiminto. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the recent years, heavy investments in the Finnish electricity distribution net-
works have been made in attempt to create a weatherproof distribution system. Accord-
ing to [1] over 8.6 billion euros will be invested in distribution networks by the end of 
2029. Although it is apparent that the reliability of the network will eventually improve, 
the renewal process is slow, and in the meanwhile, Distribution System Operators 
(DSOs) must seek cost savings also by other means. No significant reductions in the 
system average interruption durations or standard compensations paid can yet be seen 
[2, p. 39] and it is likely that the distribution networks will remain at least somewhat 
vulnerable to weather conditions for at least the next decade. Thus, fault management is 
still an important topic, especially for rural DSOs. At the center of fault management is 
the Network Control Center (NCC) and the operators that run it. One of the key tools 
used in fault management at NCC level is the Distribution Management System (DMS) 
that provides numerous functionalities to support the operator in fault situations. The 
most widely used DMS among Finnish DSOs is the ABB MicroSCADA Pro DMS600 
(DMS600). While DMS600 already provides numerous features for fault management, 
the DSOs requirements and preferences evolve over time when the Energy Authority 
changes the regulation model and more and more information becomes available from 
the primary process. Modifications to the existing features could be needed or complete-
ly new features might be considered necessary. Therefore, this thesis aims to gather the 
most recent requirements and ideas from Finnish DMS600 customers and also to pro-
vide specifications for some features that are most viable for implementation. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to gather development needs and requirements 
from Finnish DSOs, identify the most important ones and then create specifications for 
those that are chosen for implementation. The development needs and requirements will 
be gathered by interviewing representatives of the three largest Finnish DMS600 cus-
tomers as a comprehensive study, covering all Finnish DMS600 customers would be too 
laborious within the scope of this thesis. Thus, a semi-structured interview, focusing on 
the representatives of the three largest DMS600 customers will be used in the inter-
views. One of the objectives is also to first study the feasibility of the fault management 
functions already included in DMS600 by simulating actual, historical faults in a repli-
cated environment of a certain DMS600 customer. In addition, to improve understand-
ing of the DMS600 usage situation during fault management in customers’ environ-
ment, a secondary objective is also to describe the fault management processes of 
DMS600 customers and the most important features of DMS600 during fault manage-
ment. While the operating environments of DSOs may vary significantly, this thesis 
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focuses mainly on the needs and requirements of DSOs operating in rural areas and ur-
ban networks are left to minor notice. In addition, only the fault management features of 
DMS600 and improvements related to them are considered in this thesis.  
The first part of the thesis introduces the electricity distribution business in Finland, 
typical distribution automation available in Finnish distribution networks and fault situ-
ations and fault management in general. DMS600 will also be introduced more thor-
oughly in this part. The second part consists of the fault simulations and customer inter-
views. The fault simulation part mainly focuses on testing the automatic fault isolation 
and restoration feature and the fault location function that is closely related to it. Also 
some estimations of the potential benefits achievable from the use of these features are 
presented. The interviews of the DMS600 customers form a core part of this thesis. The 
three DSOs that participated in the interviews were PKS Sähkönsiirto Oy, Savon Voima 
Verkko Oy and Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy, all large DSOs operating in mostly rural are-
as. The development needs and requirements gathered are thoroughly described in the 
second part of the thesis, along with the fault management processes of each inter-
viewed DSO. Finally, the last part of the thesis describes specifications for two of the 
most important new features that were chosen for implementation analysis; a fault pri-
oritization tool and an automatic fault reporting feature. The focus is especially on the 
fault prioritization tool, since its specifications required the most work. The most viable 
future developments will also be discussed in the final part, reflecting to the results of 
the customer interviews and fault simulations. Especially the requirements for a new 
automatic fault isolation and restoration feature are reviewed, however thorough speci-
fications including usability and user interface design remain a further development 
issue. 
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2. ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION BUSINESS IN 
FINLAND 
The electricity distribution business is a natural monopoly in Finland. In 2016, there 
were 77 Distribution System Operators (DSOs), each operating in a specific geograph-
ical area, verified by the Energy Authority. The core activities in electricity distribution 
business are customer relationship management and asset management, which includes 
planning, construction and operation of the network. However, today it is common that 
at least the construction of the network is outsourced to independent contractors. [3], [4, 
pp. 21-23] 
The electricity distribution system forms the basis for electricity distribution business 
and also the operational environment for the DMS. This chapter provides a quick re-
view of the Finnish electricity distribution system, introducing e.g. the most common 
voltage-levels, network types and earthing systems.  
Due to the nature of the electricity distribution business, the industry is supervised and 
regulated by the Energy Authority. This regulation strongly affects the actions and 
needs of the DSOs, and therefore it is necessary to understand the regulation of the elec-
tricity distribution business in Finland. The regulation of the electricity distribution 
business is discussed in the latter part of this chapter. 
2.1 The Finnish electricity distribution system 
Despite the constant increase in the use of distributed renewable energy (especially 
wind power), the majority of the electricity used in Finland is still produced in central-
ized power plants [5], while consumption is widely spread across the country. For this 
reason, electricity must be transferred over long distances to the end customers. The 
objective of the Finnish power system is to fulfill this requirement safely, reliably and 
effectively. [4, p. 11], [6, pp. 54-55] 
The Finnish power system consists of the nation-wide transmission grid (400 kV, 220 
kV and some 110 kV lines), operated by Fingrid Oyj and several distribution systems, 
operated by local distribution system operators. The distribution system can be further 
divided into three parts: high-voltage network (HV) (110 kV and 45 kV), medium-
voltage (MV) network (mostly 20 kV but also 10 kV and 6 kV is used) and low-voltage 
(LV) network (1 kV/0.4 kV). [4, p. 11] In this thesis, the main focus is on the MV-
network and therefore it will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapters. 
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The Energy Authority in Finland categorizes LV-networks (𝑈𝑛 ≤ 1 𝑘𝑉), MV-networks 
(1 𝑘𝑉 < 𝑈𝑛 < 70 𝑘𝑉), and HV-networks (𝑈𝑛 = 110 𝑘𝑉) by nominal voltage 𝑈𝑛 in its 
decree [7]. An overview of the Finnish distribution system, categorized accordingly, is 
presented in Table 1 
Table 1. Overview of the network lengths and cabling rates in Finland. (adapted from 
[8]) 
Unit LV MV HV Total 
Cable (km) 102 746 27 144 226 130 117 
Cable (%) 42 19 3 33 
Other (km) 139 242 115 967 6804 262 013 
Other (%) 58 81 97 67 
Total (km) 241 989 143 111 7030 392 130 
Total (%) 62 36 2 100 
 
HV-network (or regional network/sub-transmission network) is the distribution sys-
tem’s connection point to the nation-wide transmission grid. HV-networks are operated 
by some DSOs or Regional Network Operators (RNOs). As can be seen from Table 1, 
the HV-network consists mostly of overhead lines, but due to the high reliability re-
quirement, they are usually built tree-safe. For this reason, faults in the HV-network are 
rare. HV-networks are usually built meshed and may be operated either radially or in a 
loop, although it is more common to use radial operation [6, p. 57]. HV networks are 
usually not documented in the DMS and therefore the DMS contains no functions re-
garding the HV-network. Hence, HV-networks are not discussed further in this thesis. 
Primary substations are the interface between HV- and MV-networks. A primary sub-
station traditionally includes at least one primary transformer, HV- and MV-switchgear, 
auxiliary power system and a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) for communication to the 
Network Control Center (NCC). [4] Traditionally rural MV-networks have been built 
using overhead lines and urban areas using underground cables. During the recent years, 
the use of underground cables has increased also in rural areas and the cabling rate of 
the MV-networks has increased significantly. For example, in 2009 the cabling rate of 
the MV-networks in Finland was 11 % [9], whereas in 2015 the same number was 19 
%. This is mostly a result of changes in legislation, regarding reliability of supply [10]. 
Still in 2012, the cabling rate of the Finnish MV-networks was one of the lowest in Eu-
rope, along with Greece and Ireland [11, p. 17]. MV-networks are usually built in a 
mesh, but operated radially. This results in cost savings due to simplified network calcu-
lations and protection. Due to environmental factors (poorly conducting soil), MV-
networks in Finland are built either isolated or compensated (resonant-earthed). This 
reduces the earth fault currents and touch voltages but also complicates earth fault pro-
tection and network calculations [4, pp. 176-183]. 
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In terms of network length, most of the distribution system consists of the LV-network, 
which typically covers over half of the total length of the distribution system. The LV-
networks are fed by secondary substations that consist of a distribution transformer and 
may also include remote- or manually-controlled disconnectors and an RTU for com-
munication to NCC. Each LV-feeder is usually protected by fuses at the secondary sub-
station. The LV-networks in Finland are usually built using aerial bundled cables 
(AMKA-cables) or underground cables [4, p. 11]. This makes the LV-network less 
prone to faults, compared to the MV-network. Like MV-networks, LV-networks are 
usually operated radially, although meshed configuration is sometimes available, espe-
cially in urban areas. Unlike the MV-network, the LV-network is earthed and the TN-C-
system with a combined protective earth and neutral conductor (PEN) is used. [4, p. 
199] 
The operational environments of the DSOs are clearly different. Hence, DSOs can be 
roughly classified into three categories based on the cabling rate of the MV-network; 
rural, mixed and urban. This division is based on the classifications used in [12, p. 13] 
and [13]. The division criteria are: 
• Rural DSO: cabling rate less than 30 %  
• Mixed DSO: cabling rate 30 % or higher but less than 75 %  
• Urban DSO: cabling rate 75 % or higher 
According to this classification, there were 52 rural DSOs, 20 mixed DSOs and 7 urban 
DSOs in Finland in 2015. The Energy Authority also uses a similar classification, alt-
hough the division criteria are somewhat more complex, depending on multiple tech-
nical key figures about the network. [14, p. 8] Therefore the previously defined classifi-
cation is henceforth applied in this thesis when discussing different types of DSOs. 
2.2 Regulation 
As mentioned before, the electricity distribution business is a natural monopoly and to 
operate an electrical network, a network permit is required and the operation is continu-
ally regulated. The network permits are granted by the Energy Authority that also effec-
tuates the regulation. The Energy Authority is an expert agency operating under the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The objective of the Energy Authority is to 
act as an active promoter of the energy market to find sustainable solutions in coopera-
tion with its stakeholders, while being open, impartial, appreciative and fair. [15], [16] 
The regulation of the electricity distribution business mainly focuses on the DSOs prof-
its and operational effectiveness. [4, pp. 20-21] The Electricity Market Act, which forms 
the basis for the regulation is briefly introduced in this chapter, along with the regula-
tion model currently in use. 
6 
2.2.1 The Electricity Market Act 
The regulation is based on the Electricity Market Act which entered into force in 2013. 
The act is applied for generation, import, export, transmission and sale of electrical en-
ergy. From electricity distribution business point of view, the act defines the operation 
subject to license, considers pricing, construction and operation of the network and sets 
several obligations to DSOs, regarding e.g. development of the network and reliability 
of supply. For DSOs business, one of the most important statements are the reliability 
requirements that were implemented in the law reform in 2013.  These requirements are 
defined in the sixth chapter of the act. [17] Section 51 states that  
“2) a failure of the distribution network due to a storm or snow load may not cause an     
outage longer than 6 hours in a town plan area; 
 3) a failure of the distribution network due to a storm or snow load may not cause an   
outage longer than 36 hours outside a town plan area.”. [17] 
Although there are a few exceptions to these requirements, they have put a significant 
pressure on DSOs to improve the reliability of their networks. Due to this, there is a 
transition period, during which the reliability requirements must be gradually fulfilled. 
DSOs must ensure that these requirements are fulfilled for 50 % of customers by the 
end of 2019, with the exception of holiday houses. By the end of 2023 the extent should 
be 75 % and by the end of 2028 all customers, including holiday houses, must fulfill the 
requirements. [17] It can be interpreted that, after 2028, outages lasting longer than 6 
hours in a town plan area or longer than 36 hours elsewhere, are illegal. However, 
DSOs may request additional time for the aforementioned deadlines for exceptionally 
weighty reasons. [17] 
In addition to the reliability requirements, the act defines standard compensations that 
the customer is eligible for, when an outage has lasted at least 12 hours for a continuous 
period of time. These compensations are defined in section 100 of chapter 13. [17] The 
amount of standard compensation is proportional to the annual network service fee. 
These amounts are: 
• 10 % when the outage time has been at least 12 hours but less than 24 hours 
• 25 % when the outage time has been at least 24 hours but less than 72 hours 
• 50 % when the outage time has been at least 72 hours but less than 120 hours 
• 100 % when the outage time has been at least 120 hours but less than 192 hours 
• 150 % when the outage time has been at least 192 hours but less than 288 hours 
• 200 % when the outage time exceeds 288 hours 
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The maximum refund in the form of standard compensations is, however, limited to 
2000 € over a calendar year. A customer receiving standard compensation is also not 
eligible to other fee reductions for the same outage. [17] 
2.2.2 Regulation methods 
The regulation is based on a four-year regulatory periods, for which a reasonable pricing 
criteria have been determined in advance. The Energy Authority confirms the regulation 
methods for a four-year period at a time, during which the methods remain constant. 
Then the regulation model is usually slightly altered for the following period, based on 
the experiences from the previous periods. This kind of regulation came into force on 
January 1, 2005 and currently a fourth regulatory period is underway. The fourth regula-
tory period began January 1, 2016 and the current regulation methods are valid until the 
end of 2019. [18, pp. 7-8], [19, pp. 5-7] Summary of the regulation model is presented 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Summary of the regulation model. [19, p. 6] 
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The regulation model presented above is based on calculating the difference between 
the calculated reasonable return and the realized adjusted profit. If the realized adjusted 
profit exceeds the reasonable return, the DSO has collected surplus, which must be 
equalized during the following regulatory period. In practical terms this means that the 
collected surplus must be either refunded to customers or spent in network development 
in the following regulatory period. Respectively, if the realized adjusted profit is less 
than the reasonable return, then the DSO has made a deficit and is allowed to equalize 
the deficit during the following regulatory period by raising its fees. [19, pp. 20-22]  
Both the calculated reasonable return and the realized adjusted profit consist of multiple 
different factors. Within the scope of this thesis, it is neither reasonable nor relevant to 
review all the factors implemented in the model. Thorough description of the methods is 
presented in [19]. However, efficient fault management has a significant effect on the 
quality incentive, and therefore it is introduced in more detail in the following chapter. 
2.2.3 The quality incentive and the regulatory outage costs 
The aim of the quality incentive is to create incentive for developing the quality of elec-
tricity distribution. Unlike in a competitive market, this kind of incentive is not naturally 
present in a monopoly and therefore it must be implemented with regulatory methods. 
The DSO is required to achieve at least the reliability level required by the Electricity 
Market Act but the quality incentive also encourages for improvements beyond the min-
imum level. [19, pp. 68-69] 
The regulatory outage costs (Keskeytyksestä Aiheutunut Haitta, KAH-costs) form the 
basis for the quality incentive and hence, are of great interest to the DSOs. The KAH-
costs take into account the number and duration of planned and unexpected outages and 
the number of rapid and delayed auto-reclosings. These incidents are then valued ac-
cording to the unit prices presented in Table 2. [19, pp. 69-71] 
Table 2. Unit prices of the disadvantage caused by outages. (adapted from [19, p. 71]) 
Unexpected  
outage 
Planned  
outage 
Delayed auto-
reclosing 
Rapid  
auto-reclosing 
𝒉𝑬,𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒙𝒑 ℎ𝑊,𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 ℎ𝐸,𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛 ℎ𝑊,𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛 ℎ𝐷𝐴𝑅 ℎ𝑅𝐴𝑅 
€ / kWh € / kW € / kWh € / kW € / kW € / kW 
11,0 1,1 6,8 0,5 1,1 0,55 
 
The unit prices presented in Table 2 are based on a study conducted by Tampere Uni-
versity of Technology and Helsinki University of Technology in 2005 [20]. The DSOs 
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provide the outage information for the Energy Authority, according to the decree [7]. 
Based on this information, the annual KAH-costs are calculated according to Equation 
(1). 
𝐾𝐴𝐻𝑡,𝑘 = (
𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝,𝑡 × ℎ𝐸,𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝐾𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝,𝑡 × ℎ𝑊,𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 +
𝐾𝐴𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑡 × ℎ𝐸,𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛 + 𝐾𝑀𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑡 × ℎ𝑊,𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛   +
𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑡 × ℎ𝐷𝐴𝑅 + 𝑅𝐴𝑅𝑡 × ℎ𝑅𝐴𝑅
) ×
𝑊𝑡
𝑇𝑡
×
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑘
𝐶𝑃𝐼2005
 (1) 
where 
𝐾𝐴𝐻𝑡,𝑘  = realized regulatory outage costs in year t in value of money for year k, 
[€] 
𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝,𝑡  = outage period caused by unexpected outages in the medium-voltage    
distribution network, weighted by annual energies, [hrs] 
𝐾𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝,𝑡 = outage amount caused by unexpected outages in the medium-voltage 
distribution network, weighted by annual energies, [pcs] 
𝐾𝐴𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑡  = outage period caused by planned outages in the medium-voltage dis-
tribution network, weighted by annual energies [hrs] 
𝐾𝑀𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑡  = outage amount caused by planned outages in the medium-voltage dis-
tribution network, [pcs] 
𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑡  = outage amount caused by delayed auto-reclosings in the medium-
voltage network, weighted by annual energies, [pcs] 
𝑅𝐴𝑅𝑡  = outage amount caused by rapid auto-reclosings in the medium-voltage 
network, weighted by annual energies, [pcs] 
𝑊𝑡  = volume of transmitted energy in year t, [kWh] 
𝑇𝑡  = number of hours in year t, [hrs] 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑘  = consumer price index of year k 
𝐶𝑃𝐼2005  = consumer price index of year 2005 
When calculating the quality incentive, the KAH-costs are compared to the reference 
level, which is the average of the DSO’s annual KAH-costs from the two previous regu-
latory periods. If the realized regulatory outage costs are higher than the reference level, 
they increase the realized adjusted profit and therefore decrease the allowed operating 
profit. Respectively, the allowed operating profit is increased if the realized regulatory 
outage costs stay below the reference level. The difference of the realized KAH-costs 
and the reference level is now taken into account in full, when calculating the realized 
adjusted profit. In the previous regulatory periods, only half of the difference was taken 
into account, so the effect of KAH-costs is emphasized in the fourth period. However, 
to make the impact of the quality incentive reasonable, the effect of the incentive is lim-
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ited by a maximum limit. Therefore the incentive may reduce or increase the DSO’s 
reasonable return for the year in question by a maximum of 15 %. [19, pp. 66-76] 
In addition to the quality incentive, the KAH-costs are also taken into account in the 
efficiency incentive. In the efficiency incentive, they are modelled as an undesirable 
output when determining the DSO’s efficiency from the output/input ratio. The KAH-
costs were implemented in the efficiency incentive to prevent “improvement” of effi-
ciency by cutting reliability-related maintenance costs. [19, pp. 76-79], [18, pp. 11-12] 
2.3 Reliability indices 
In addition to the KAH-costs, international reliability indices are used to indicate the 
reliability of a distribution system. These indices have originally been developed by the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in 1998 and they are widely 
used in the industry. The indices are defined in IEEE Standard 1366. [21], [4, p. 45] The 
most common indices are: 
• System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), which indicates the total 
outage time for the average customer during a predefined period of time. It is 
commonly measured in hours or minutes of interruption. 
• System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), which indicates how of-
ten the average customer experiences a sustained interruption during a prede-
fined period of time. 
• Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), which indicates the 
average length of an interruption experienced by a customer. 
• Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI), which indicates 
how often a customer experiences a momentary interruption during a predefined 
period of time. 
These indices are used for e.g. DSO’s internal reporting and planning and comparison 
of the reliability of different DSOs networks. The same indices are also presented in the 
annual outage statistics compiled by Finnish Energy, an organization representing com-
panies that produce, acquire, transmit or sell energy. The IEEE Standard 1366 defines 
also various other indices, but the aforementioned four are the most commonly used 
ones in Finland. 
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3. DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATION 
Distribution automation comprises a system or a set of devices used to plan, operate, 
monitor and control the distribution network remotely. [22] Typical distribution auto-
mation includes e.g. Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), such as microprocessor 
based relays, RTUs and IT-systems, such as the DMS. From a system point of view, 
network automation is crucial, as the exploitability and usability of the DMS and Su-
pervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is highly dependent on the available 
network automation. With higher level of automation in the network, more functions 
can also be utilized in the DMS. According to the Distribution Automation concept 
(DA-concept), distribution automation can be divided into company, NCC, substation, 
network and customer levels [22, p. 401]. This concept is, however, rather old and in 
this thesis a simplified classification of devices and systems is used. The classification 
used in this thesis is represented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Different levels of distribution automation. 
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The main motives for the use of distribution automation are [22, pp. 401-402]: 
• Savings in construction, renovation and maintenance costs  
• Better overall control and reliability of the network 
NCC automation will be discussed in chapter 3.1, along with the common IT-systems 
used. In chapter 3.2, the most common network automation devices are introduced, with 
respect to this thesis. Finally, the interface between the two levels of distribution auto-
mation; communication in distribution network is reviewed in chapter 3.3. 
3.1 NCC and IT-systems 
Network Control Center (NCC) is a location used for centralized monitoring and control 
of the network. The personnel operating the network in the NCC are called operators. 
The most common arrangement is to have one centralized NCC for the whole network, 
but some DSOs have also divided the responsibility of their operating area to multiple 
NCCs. It is also common to have a secondary NCC in a separate location to ensure con-
trol of the network if the primary NCC cannot be used, due to e.g. a fire. Furthermore, 
DSOs with small operating area may also use a so-called mobile NCC, where the NCC 
functions are performed from a single notebook computer that is carried along by the 
operator on duty [4, p. 231]. The NCC is typically responsible for: 
• Network state monitoring and control 
• Fault management and reporting 
• Management of maintenance operations 
• Switching planning 
• Customer information and support 
On top of all, while executing the aforementioned tasks, the NCC is responsible for the 
electrical safety of the field crews working in the field. [4, p. 231] Especially in fault 
situations, effective operation of the NCC is of paramount importance. Efficient use and 
prioritization of resources by the NCC greatly affects the efficiency of the fault man-
agement process. Typically all MV-switching operations in the field must be approved 
by the NCC before they can be carried out. Therefore, if there are a lot of simultaneous 
faults, it is common that the NCC is congested with incoming calls and becomes a bot-
tleneck in the fault management process. Due to this, it is necessary to have both 
enough SCADA workstations and competent operators. To ensure sufficient availability 
of competent personnel in the NCC during major power disruptions, some DSOs have 
introduced internal training programs to train secondary operators from personnel nor-
mally working with other tasks. [23] 
To carry out all the aforementioned tasks effectively, the NCC utilizes various IT-
systems. The two primary tools for NCC personnel are Supervisory Control and Data 
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Acquisition (SCADA) and DMS. These systems and their common integration with 
other systems and information sources is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Primary IT-systems used in the NCC and their integration with other systems. 
These systems are introduced in the following subchapters with a little more detail. The 
DMS is introduced here only briefly on a general level and the specific product 
(DMS600) developed by ABB is discussed more thoroughly later in chapter 4.3.3. 
3.1.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition  
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is a system used to directly moni-
tor and control the distribution process in real-time. It gathers and stores information 
from the distribution process and sends control commands to the devices in the network. 
The main functions of a SCADA system typically include overview of the distribution 
process, alarms, remote-control of the switching devices, remote reading of measure-
ments, remote configuration of IEDs and reporting. [4, p. 235] 
The requirement for the reliability of the SCADA system is high. Due to this, the power 
supply for the SCADA system is usually ensured with Uninterruptible Power Source 
(UPS) system. It is also common to use hot-standby with duplicated process database 
and SCADA computers. This means, that when a failure occurs on the primary comput-
er, the secondary one takes over the process with little or no interruption. The infor-
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mation in the process database changes rapidly and to maintain real-time awareness of 
the switching state, the information must be reliable at all times, to all users. Due to this, 
only the latest information is stored in the process database. [4, pp. 235-236] 
As an example of a SCADA system, Figure 4 represents the graphical user interface of 
ABB’s MicroSCADA Pro SYS600. In SCADA, detailed information is usually only 
available on primary substations and the network is often represented in a schematic 
view as shown in Figure 4. The typical alarm and event displays are also visible. 
 
Figure 4. User interface of ABB's MicroSCADA Pro SYS600. 
In addition to high reliability, flexible and easy integration between SCADA and other 
IT-systems is also required as DSOs often acquire their systems from different vendors 
[24, pp. 64-86]. This integration can be implemented in several ways, using e.g. transfer 
files, application programming interfaces or middleware. Particularly important is the 
interface with the DMS. This is usually implemented using OPC (OLE for Process Con-
trol) or ELCOM-90 (Electric Utilities Communication) standards or using SCIL-API 
programming interface, developed by ABB [25, pp. 22-31]. More information on the 
interfaces between different IT-systems in distribution network operation can be found 
in [25]. 
The most widely used SCADA systems in Finland are ABB’s MicroSCADA Pro 
SYS600, Netcon 3000 by Netcontrol Oy and Spectrum Power by Siemens. According 
to [26] the SCADA systems market was controlled by these three actors in 2005, which 
mostly applies also today. DSOs tend to make a long-term commitment to the system 
provider, since switching over to another vendor’s system usually requires a lot of work. 
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3.1.2 Distribution Management System 
Distribution Management System (DMS) typically contains a set of functions for real-
time network topology management, analysis and inference, operation planning, fault 
management, customer service and reporting. Unlike SCADA, the DMS does not gather 
information by itself, but instead utilizes information gathered by several other systems. 
This information is then used to support the user in e.g. decision-making. A modern 
DMS typically has interfaces with at least SCADA, Network Information System (NIS), 
Customer Information System, Meter Reading System (MRS) and Work Management 
System (WMS). [27, pp. 31-42], [4, pp. 236-244] 
On a more detailed level, the network analysis functions usually include power-flow 
and fault current calculations, which are then used for e.g. protection analysis. Opera-
tion planning functions include e.g. tools for switching planning and network switching 
state optimization. Event analysis, fault location, field crew management, network resto-
ration and reporting are the typical functions for fault management. Furthermore, to 
provide customers with more accurate information regarding the faulted areas, the cus-
tomer service function is used. This is usually implemented by integrating the DMS 
with Short Message Service (SMS), telephone answering machine and web outage map, 
available on the DSO’s web site. [27, pp. 31-42], [4, pp. 236-244] 
In the DMS, the network is typically presented on top of a geographical map but sche-
matic views may also be available. Both MV- and LV-networks are usually documented 
in the DMS and, unlike in SCADA, specific information on network components (e.g. 
conductor types, transformer rated capacities, installation dates) is also available. The 
DMS functions mentioned above are introduced more thoroughly in chapter 4.3.3, along 
with ABB’s DMS600 Workstation (WS). In addition to ABB’s DMS600 WS, Trimble 
DMS by Trimble Inc. is also widely used among Finnish DSOs.  
3.1.3 Other systems 
The SCADA and DMS are the primary tools for the operators in the NCC, but the DSOs 
typically have several other systems that are also vital for the network operation pro-
cess. From NCC point of view, these systems are mostly utilized in the background, 
acting as a basis for the utilization of the DMS, but sometimes they may also be used 
directly. The most important such systems are the Network Information System (NIS), 
Customer Information System (CIS), Meter Data Management/Reading System 
(MDMS/MRS) and Work Management System (WMS). These systems are briefly in-
troduced in this chapter. [4, pp. 236-237], [25, pp. 6-13] 
The Network Information System (NIS) contains the network information and also pro-
vides functions for e.g. network planning and maintenance. The network information is 
typically stored in a relational database that contains information on the location of the 
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conductors and components, along with their interconnection and technical specifica-
tions. This database is used to provide information for other systems, such as the DMS, 
and therefore a NIS-DMS –interface is required. Similar systems are also known as 
AM/FM/GIS (Automated Mapping/Facilities Management/Geographic Information 
System). [4, pp. 265-268] 
The Customer Information System (CIS) is used for customer relationship management. 
In electricity distribution business, it is used mainly for customer information manage-
ment, billing and customer service. The customer information stored in the CIS data-
base typically includes e.g. consumer group, energy consumption and billing infor-
mation. This information is applied in multiple situations in both network operation and 
planning. For example, customer information can be used in prioritization during fault 
management process. [25, p. 10] 
Meter Data Management System (MDMS) gathers, stores and processes metering data 
from the AMR devices. It is closely integrated with the Meter Reading System (MRS) 
that comprises of the actual metering devices, data concentrator units and other infra-
structure required for remote measurement. The metering data is processed and stored in 
MDMS database and it can be used e.g. for load forecasting. The DMS also utilizes 
MRS for LV-network alarms and remote queries. [28, pp. 30-43], [25, pp. 10-12] 
Work Management System (WMS) is used for managing e.g. maintenance and construc-
tion -related work processes. It provides support for ensuring that all workflows and 
processes are executed. WMS typically includes functionalities for e.g. work order 
management and billing. Often reporting functions are also available. If WMS is inte-
grated with DMS, e.g. LV-fault reports filled in through the WMS can be automatically 
transferred to the DMS. Also in a fault situation, automatic generation of work orders is 
possible based on the information provided by the DMS.  
3.2 Network automation 
Network automation can be divided roughly into two categories; control devices and 
monitoring devices. [29, p. 1] Control devices are the actuators that perform the me-
chanical opening and closing operations. The control devices used in Finnish distribu-
tion networks consist mainly of sectionalizing circuit breakers and remote-controlled 
disconnectors. Monitoring devices monitor the state of the network and measure and 
gather information from the network. Typical monitoring devices include e.g. protective 
relays, fault indicators and AMR devices. These most common network automation 
devices will be introduced in the corresponding subchapters and also their relation to 
fault management in the DMS will be considered. 
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3.2.1 Control devices 
Traditionally, the majority of control devices in the network are manual operated dis-
connectors. These devices have to be operated on-site, and therefore performing switch-
ings can be time-consuming. Remote-controlled disconnectors (RCD) are similar devic-
es, but are equipped with a motor and an RTU to enable remote-control via SCADA. 
With RCDs the operation time can usually be reduced e.g. from 30 minutes to 1-2 
minutes, depending on the location and readiness of the field crew. [4, p. 151] In addi-
tion to fault-isolation purposes, they are also suitable for reliable isolation during 
maintenance work, however remote-control must be disabled and the device securely 
locked. RCDs are usually pole mounted or located inside a secondary substation. The 
auxiliary power is supplied from the distribution network through an auxiliary trans-
former and the device is equipped with a UPS system to enable operation when the net-
work is not energized. During long outages, when the batteries of the UPS system have 
depleted or when the communication to SCADA is not working, the disconnector can 
be operated manually on-site. RCDs are the most common devices for controlling the 
MV-network remotely and sufficient amount of these devices must be installed in the 
network to enable the use of advanced functions in the DMS. 
A sectionalizing circuit breaker (SCB) is a remote-controllable switching device, 
equipped with a protective relay, much like the ones located at the primary substation. 
SCBs are usually pole mounted and mainly used in overhead line networks, although 
solutions for cabled networks are also available [30]. Comparing to RCDs, the ad-
vantage with SCBs is that customers located before the faulted section do not experi-
ence an outage. SCB is designed to be capable of breaking even the highest fault cur-
rents, but it cannot be used to reliably isolate a line section for e.g. maintenance work. It 
may also include functions for rapid and delayed auto-reclosings (RAR/DAR). 
3.2.2 Monitoring devices 
The aforementioned remote-controlled switching devices are essential to remotely con-
trol the network and utilize, e.g. automatic restoration functions in the DMS. In addi-
tion, devices for fault detection, measurements and location are needed for accurate de-
termination of the fault location.  
Modern protective relays used in MV-networks are microprocessor-based IEDs, con-
taining functions for at least short circuit protection, earth fault protection and auto-
reclosings. In addition, functions for e.g. power quality assessment, fault location and 
disturbance recordings are also often available. [31], [32] The relays are located in the 
primary substation but can be configured remotely from the NCC via SCADA or with a 
specific configuration software, provided by the manufacturer. From DMS point of 
view, it is important that the relays in the substation are capable of reliably measuring 
fault impedances and currents and transmitting the information to the DMS, as this in-
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formation is used as a basis for the fault location function in the DMS. Overall, the 
basic requirements for protective relays are reliable, selective and fast operation [6, pp. 
342-343].  
Fault indicators are devices designed to detect and indicate faults in the network. Short-
circuit detection is usually based on detecting the overcurrent generated by a short-
circuit, but for earth fault detection the used methods vary depending on the grounding 
of the network. In high impedance networks (unearthed or compensated) the detection 
can be based on e.g. measuring changes in the zero sequence current [33, pp. 41-45] or 
monitoring the polarity of the zero sequence current and voltage [34]. The indication 
method can be either visual or remote. Visual indications can only be detected on-site 
but with remote indication, the information is available in the DMS and/or SCADA. 
Figure 5 represents the principle of fault indicator operation and implementation. 
 
Figure 5. Principle of fault indicator operation and implementation [35, p. 5]. 
So far, fault indicators are not widely used in Finnish distribution networks, although 
there have been some pilot projects by a few DSOs. [36], [37] Also, according to [37, 
pp. 60-69], there has been some problems regarding the reliability of the indicators in-
stalled. With reliable indication information, the fault location and isolation process 
could be expedited significantly, especially in cabled networks where the fault location 
is usually not clearly visible. 
AMR meters are often the only automation devices available in the LV-network. They 
are mainly used for remote reading of the hourly energy consumption data. However, 
the devices often also include functions that can be utilized in fault management. Typi-
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cal functions useful for fault management include alarms for unsupplied customer, loss 
of phases (blown fuses), voltage unbalance and zero sequence faults. The alarms can be 
either spontaneous or the information can be gathered with a query from the DMS. The 
meters also provides customer-specific outage data for e.g. customer service and report-
ing purposes. Implementation of the AMR system has notably changed the LV-fault 
management process. Traditionally the DSO has received information about an LV-
outage from an unsupplied customer via phone but now the AMR system enables al-
most immediate detection of LV-faults. The aforementioned queries can also be utilized 
in locating the fault, and with a suitable algorithm, the meters can also detect broken 
conductors in the MV-network, which are often not detected by the relays in the prima-
ry substation. Although AMR meters have been categorized as monitoring devices in 
this thesis, some solutions may also include control features, enabling e.g. automatic 
isolation in case of a zero sequence fault. In some cases, the control features may also 
be used remotely from the NCC to e.g. switch off the electricity supply due to overdue 
electricity bills. [4, pp. 258-259] 
3.3 Communication in distribution network 
With increasing amount of automation, the distribution network has become more and 
more dependent on communications. However, the importance of the communication 
links vary. For example the reliability requirement for primary substation communica-
tion is considerably higher than that of the AMR measurements. Furthermore, the ca-
pacity, security and cost-efficiency of the technology must be taken into consideration. 
For these reasons, multiple different communication technologies are utilized in distri-
bution networks. To enable interconnection of different devices from different vendors, 
a set of common rules is also needed. These rules are called protocols and they govern 
the format of messages, the generation of checking information, the flow control and the 
actions to be taken in the event of errors. [38, p. 461] The most common communica-
tion technologies and protocols will be reviewed in this chapter, focusing especially on 
the ones used in Finnish distribution networks. 
The communication technologies used in Finnish distribution networks consist mainly 
of the following: 
• Cable (optical fiber or copper) 
• Mobile network (2G, 3G, 4G) 
• Radio link 
• Satellite 
• Power-Line Carrier (PLC) 
Fixed cable links are usually applied in primary substation communication due to their 
high reliability and capacity. Optical fiber is also immune to electrical disturbances. The 
20 
installation of fixed cable links is, however often expensive, especially with long-range 
communications.  
Traditionally DSOs, the large ones in particular, have operated their own radio link 
networks to facilitate the communications in the distribution network. [39, pp. 404-411] 
Today some DSOs have noted, that the radio link network is not necessarily capable of 
fulfilling the requirements for communication in smart grids. With the development of 
the public mobile networks an alternative approach for communication solution has 
come up. For example the second-largest Finnish DSO Elenia uses IP-based communi-
cation over public mobile networks in primary substation communication with satellite 
backup connection. [40], [41] Utilizing 3rd (UMTS, HSPA) and 4th (LTE, WiMAX) 
generation mobile telecommunication technologies, high performance can be achieved 
cost-efficiently. Currently, the public mobile networks can reach data rates of over 100 
Mbit/s, although the rates vary considerably across the country. [42] Mobile networks 
are also used for less vital communications such as AMR measurements and remote-
controlling of disconnectors. For these purposes, the GSM and GPRS technologies are 
sufficient, albeit they may become congested if hundreds of messages are being sent 
simultaneously via the same base station. [39, pp. 409-410] Today the public mobile 
networks and electricity distribution networks have become highly interdependent. The 
mobile network base stations are dependent on the supply electricity and during long 
outages, the mobile network may not be available in the outage areas. Meanwhile, the 
distribution networks require the availability of the mobile network to maintain control 
of the distribution network in fault situations (e.g. isolations with remote-controlled 
disconnectors). 
Satellite connections are rare and often slow, e.g. in the case of Elenia the data rate is 40 
kB/s. [41] Therefore they are more suitable to be used as a backup-connection. Power-
Line Carrier (PLC) is a technology where the electrical conductors are utilized as a 
transmission medium. In PLC the transmitted signal is modulated into the power wave, 
using high frequency. PLC has been used especially in remote reading and setting of 
AMR meters, however the data rates in PLC are very low (few kbits/s at most). For this 
reason, it is more efficient to use PLC in LV-networks to transfer data from the AMR 
meters to secondary substations, where a hub/concentrator unit forwards the information 
via, e.g. GPRS. [4, pp. 245-247] 
In addition to the physical mediums and technologies used to transmit information, 
common rules, i.e. protocols are needed to ensure mutual understanding of different 
devices and systems. Different protocols exist for e.g. communication between the IEDs 
inside a primary substation and communication between a primary substation and the 
NCC. Along with international standard protocols, released by the International Electro-
technical Commission (IEC), multiple de facto standards and proprietary protocols are 
also used in the industry. The most common communication protocols used in Finland 
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will be reviewed in the following. Illustration of the commonly used protocols, along 
with communication technologies is presented in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Illustration of common communication technologies and protocols. 
For primary substation communication, IEC 61850 is the latest commonly used proto-
col. It defines a complete data model and introduces an XML-based language for ven-
dor-independent method of describing devices and their configurations. It also introduc-
es Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages that enable direct 
communication between different devices via IEC 61850 station bus. This, for instance, 
reduces the amount of wiring required (better flexibility and expandability) and im-
proves the protection coordination. Overall, the IEC 61850 improves the interoperabil-
ity of different devices from different vendors and facilitates more efficient device inte-
gration, which results in better cost-efficiency. [43], [44] A comprehensive study re-
garding IEC 61850 can be found in [45]. Besides IEC 61850, protocols used for primary 
substation communication include e.g. IEC-60870-5-103 (often abbreviated as IEC-
103), SPA-bus developed by ABB and Modbus, developed by Modicon. [46] These 
protocols are however rather old and are phasing out as the DSOs are switching over to 
the newer IEC 61850. 
IEC 60870-5-101 (IEC-101), along with its expansion IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC-104) are 
the most widely used protocols for communication between the substation RTU and the 
SCADA system. They are both companion standards of the IEC 60870-5 standard set 
for telecontrol and communication in distribution automation. IEC-101 is a rather old 
standard, released in the beginning of the 1990s, but is still widely used today. It defines 
an interoperability list that is used to ensure interoperability between devices of differ-
ent vendors. In the list, applicable functions for devices are marked by vendors and 
common denominator between different vendors can be used to find the possible func-
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tion range. IEC-101 is designed for serial communication with relatively slow transmis-
sion media (9600 bit/s to 64000 bit/s, depending on the interface). [47] IEC-104 is an 
extension of the IEC-101, which facilitates the use of standard TCP/IP network in 
communication between the NCC and the primary substation. This enables simultane-
ous data transmission between multiple devices. [48] Another commonly used protocol 
is the DNP 3.0 (Distributed Network Protocol). It is closely related to IEC-101 but pro-
vides some additional features that make it somewhat superior, compared to IEC-101. 
One of these features is the ability to run TCP/IP based communication, much like with 
IEC-104. [49] 
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4. FAULTS AND FAULT MANAGEMENT IN GEN-
ERAL 
The standard SFS-EN-50160:2010 defines an outage as a condition in which the voltage 
at the supply terminals is less than 5 % of the reference voltage. The outages can be 
classified into planned outages and unexpected outages. In a planned outage, the cus-
tomer is notified in advance whereas an unexpected outage is caused by a permanent or 
transient fault, mostly related to external events, equipment failures or interference. The 
unexpected outages can be further classified as: [50, p. 14]  
• a short outage, when the outage duration is 3 minutes or less 
• a long outage, when the outage duration exceeds 3 minutes 
Majority of the unexpected outages are short, (e.g. around 90 % in a network consisting 
mostly of overhead lines) and are typically cleared by the auto-reclosing operations 
(RAR/DAR). [4, pp. 79-80] In cabled networks, however, the outages are usually 
caused by permanent faults and therefore auto-reclosings are typically not used. Long 
outages are less common, but require reparative actions, since they are caused by per-
manent faults. In this chapter, the basic fault types and sources are reviewed along with 
major power disruption situations and their effects in both rural and urban networks. 
Also, the general fault management process and its progress is discussed in the final 
subchapters.  
4.1 Fault types and causes 
There are two basic types of faults that commonly occur in the distribution network; 
short-circuits and earth faults. In the MV-network, however, they are clearly different 
by nature and therefore require e.g. different kind of protection solutions and location 
techniques. In the LV-networks, fault protection is fairly straightforward and a simple 
overcurrent protection is sufficient with fuses being the most common protective de-
vice. With short-circuits, the case is also similar in the MV-network, but due to the 
earthing systems used in the MV-network, the behavior of the network during an earth 
fault is clearly different than during a short-circuit. For this reason, a different kind of 
solution for earth fault protection is required. A clear majority of the outages experi-
enced by customers are caused by a fault in the MV-network, possibly over 90 % ac-
cording to [4, p. 125]. Hence, this chapter discusses the two fault types mainly in MV-
network context. 
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4.1.1 Short-circuit faults 
Short-circuit faults occur when two or more line conductors are connected through an 
unintended path with very low impedance. Typical causes for a short-circuit are e.g. 
breakdown of insulation or a fallen tree branch that connects two phase conductors to-
gether (overhead networks). The two most common types of short-circuit faults are two- 
and three-phase short-circuits. The currents in both situations are typically higher than 
load currents. For example, a typical three-phase short-circuit current in the busbar of a 
primary substation is 5-12 kA and often 500-2000 A in the network. Therefore, an over-
current protection can be utilized for short-circuit faults. Due to the high magnitudes of 
three-phase short-circuit currents, the detection is usually fairly simple. However, low-
impedance three-phase short-circuits occurring near the primary substation often cause 
significant voltage dips for all customers fed by the same primary transformer and 
therefore require rapid clearing. The highest three-phase short-circuit currents in the 
network are often interesting to ensure the withstand capability of the conductors during 
a fault. Besides the basic two- and three-phase short-circuits, there is also a special case, 
a so called earth short-circuit. In this case there is also a conductive connection to earth 
while two or three phase conductors are short-circuited. [4, pp. 28-33] 
The magnitude of the fault current in a two-phase short-circuit is usually lower, approx-
imately 87 % of the corresponding three-phase short-circuit current. Therefore the two-
phase short-circuit currents at the end of long feeders are often of particular interest to 
ensure the correct operation of the feeder protection in all situations. Sometimes when 
the feeder load current is high and the two-phase short-circuit current is low (e.g. 150-
200 A), selective and reliable configuration of the feeder protection may be troublesome 
and network reinforcements may be needed. [4, pp. 29-30] 
The modelling of three-phase short-circuits is quite simple, as they are symmetrical by 
nature. However, with two-phase short-circuits, the situation is different and therefore 
symmetrical components must be used. This modelling is used in the DMS for a variety 
of functions, e.g. fault current calculations for protection analysis and constraint check-
ing and determination of the fault location based on the measured fault current. The 
modelling theory will not be discussed further in this thesis. Further information is 
available at e.g. [4] and [6]. The DMS and its functions will be introduced in more de-
tail in chapter 4.3.3. 
4.1.2 Earth faults 
The most common fault type in the distribution network is the earth fault. According to 
[51, p. 2] even 70 % of the unexpected outages may be caused by an earth fault. An 
earth fault occurs when a phase conductor is connected to earth or to a component that 
is directly connected to earth, through a very low impedance. A typical cause for an 
earth fault is a fallen tree that forms a connection between the earth and a line conduc-
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tor. Earth faults may generate potentially dangerous touch and step voltages. To reduce 
these voltages to a safe level, either the earth resistance or the earth fault current must 
be reduced. Due to poorly conduction soil in Finland, heavy earthings would be needed 
to reduce the earth resistance sufficiently, which would be very costly. For this reason, 
the earth fault current is reduced by building the MV-networks as isolated, which means 
that no earthing is used at all, or resonant-earthed (i.e. compensated) by earthing the 
network through an inductive reactance. This in turn complicates the detection and 
analysis of earth faults. In addition to the single-phase earth fault, it is also possible to 
have two different phase conductors connected to earth simultaneously in different loca-
tions. These conductors are then short-circuited through the earth. This is called a cross-
country fault. [4, pp. 176-183] 
The earth fault current is typically very low in both isolated and compensated networks. 
Particularly in overhead feeders, the current is often less than 10 A, which is clearly 
lower than the typical load current and therefore rules out traditional overcurrent protec-
tion. Instead, methods based on measuring the zero sequence current and voltage and 
the phase angle between them must be introduced. Especially troublesome are the high-
impedance earth faults which are not often detected by traditional feeder protection. A 
conductor break with the feeding end not touching the ground is an example of a very 
high-impedance earth fault. These faults have traditionally been impossible to detect, 
but some AMR meters now provide the ability to detect the MV-conductor breaks from 
the LV-side. [4, pp. 190-198] Unlike with short-circuit faults, calculation of the fault 
location during an earth fault is practically not possible in compensated networks since 
no device is usually capable of reliably measuring the required fault impedances for the 
calculation. The recent extensive cabling of feeders has increased the earth fault cur-
rents and power losses, forcing the DSOs to add compensation coils to their networks. 
[52] Hence, the compensated networks are becoming increasingly common and for the 
moment, generally the only way to locate earth faults without fault indicators is by uti-
lizing experimental switchings. Experimental switching methods are discussed further 
in chapter 4.3.1. 
4.1.3 Sources of faults 
As previously discussed in chapter 2.1, there are different types of DSOs, based on the 
type of network they are operating and therefore at least somewhat different challenges 
are faced by different types of DSOs. While the clear majority of the faults occurred in a 
rural DSO’s network are caused by natural phenomena like wind or snow, in an urban 
DSO’s network faults are more commonly caused by actions of outsiders or defects in 
design. This is illustrated in Figure 7, where the average interruption durations for cus-
tomers in different types of networks are visualized for the year 2014. In this figure, 
“natural phenomena” comprise factors like wind, snow, ice, thunder and wildlife and 
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“technical causes” are defects in design or misoperations by DSO. The “other causes” 
include e.g. planned outages and the actions of outsiders. 
 
Figure 7. The average interruption durations for a customer (SAIDI) in different types 
of networks in 2014. (adapted from [53]) 
As can be seen, natural phenomena accounts for a clear majority of the annual outage 
time in rural areas but is somewhat marginal factor in urban areas. Faults in total are 
also significantly less common in urban areas. Therefore urban DSOs’ requirements and 
preferences regarding fault management are often somewhat different from those of 
rural DSOs’ and also the importance of fault management in general is lower. 
4.2 Major power disruptions 
Major power disruption refers to a severe fault situation where a significant number of 
customers in a certain area are experiencing an outage simultaneously for a considerable 
period of time. In the literature, there are various different terms describing this kind of 
situation. The IEEE uses the terms “Major Event” and “Major Event Day” [21, p. 19]. 
The terms “major outage” and “major blackout” are also used in international literature 
when referring to a similar situation. In the Finnish literature, the term “major disturb-
ance” is commonly used in theses and reports (e.g. [54], [55], [56]). With this term, 
however, it should also be specified what is the subject of the disturbance, since based 
on a quick Google search, the same term is used internationally for all kinds of disturb-
ances. The term “major power disruption” specifies the subject and has been used in 
both international and Finnish literature (e.g. [57], [23]) and is therefore used henceforth 
in this thesis. In addition, “major power disruption” may also refer to a failure of the 
nation-wide transmission grid that causes extensive outages throughout the country. In 
this thesis, however, only the outages originating from faults in the distribution network 
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will be considered and the term “major power disruption” refers to an extensive outage 
situation in the distribution network level. 
There is no one clear definition for a major power disruption. The IEEE defines a Major 
Event as “an event that exceeds reasonable design and/or operational limits of the elec-
tric power system” [21, p. 19]. A Major Event also includes at least one Major Event 
Day (MED). MED is a day during which the daily SAIDI exceeds a certain threshold 
value that is calculated from historical daily SAIDI data [21, pp. 34-40]. In a collabora-
tive report by Tampere University of Technology and Lappeenranta University of 
Technology, a major power disruption is defined as a situation where over 20 % of the 
customers of a DSO are unsupplied or where a 110 kV transmission line, 110/20 kV 
primary substation or a primary transformer is faulted for several hours. [58, p. 40] In 
addition, severity ratings for different major power disruptions are introduced in [59, pp. 
71-90], based on the probability, extent and duration of the situation. DSOs often also 
have their own criteria for a major power disruption, which may be based on e.g. the 
percentage of unsupplied customers, amount of simultaneous faults or the importance of 
unsupplied customers. These criteria may be used in fault management to evaluate the 
situation in real-time. DSOs may, for example, have a distinct organizational setup for 
handling major power disruptions that is activated based on some evaluation criteria. 
[23] These criteria are discussed further in chapter 7. Major power disruptions as a phe-
nomena are somewhat different in different types of networks and hence will be dis-
cussed separately in the following chapters. 
4.2.1 Causes and effects in a rural DSO’s network 
In a rural area, major power disruptions almost always originate from severe weather 
conditions. Hence, it is typical that there are a lot of faults spread across a wide geo-
graphical area and outages can be expected in the operational areas of several DSOs. 
Therefore all available resources are usually activated to cope with the situation and 
even so resources must be prioritized, especially in the early stages of the disruption. In 
addition, since it is common that several DSOs in a certain area are affected by the dis-
ruption, it may be difficult to e.g. lend resources (personnel and equipment) from the 
neighboring DSOs or their subcontractors. 
Typically the outages experienced during a major power disruption last long, even sev-
eral days for some customers. The situation is particularly challenging if the disruption 
occurs during the winter. With temperatures well below the freezing point during pro-
longed outages, there is a considerable risk of damages to property and even to human 
health. It is also common that some mobile network base stations go down, causing the 
mobile network to go out of service in certain areas. This, in turn, causes insecurity and 
complicates the fault management process. Even during the summer, some home care 
patients are at risk and significant hindrance is caused to everyone affected by the out-
age. [60, p. 13] 
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Apart from the customers living in the rural area, there are usually several local munici-
pality centers located in the operational areas of rural DSOs. It is possible that some of 
them become completely unsupplied during a major power disruption. In such case, the 
private and public services are interrupted. This includes e.g. shops, banks, healthcare 
centers and schools. The water supply is also partly dependent on electricity and there-
fore it may also be interrupted. Although the outages in a municipality center are usual-
ly not as long as in the rural areas, there have been cases where prolonged outages have 
forced the authorities to consider even partial evacuations. [60, pp. 13-14], [61], [62] 
As an example, the Tapani-Hannu-storm that occurred on consecutive days after 
Christmas in 2011 caused outages for over 500 000 people and has arguably had signif-
icant overall impacts on the society and the energy industry. This major power disrup-
tion resulted in immense media attention and public concern about the reliability of 
electricity supply in Finland, which eventually led to the previously described changes 
in legislation. In a research conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office in 2017 [63], an 
assessment was made to project the effects of a similar storm for the year 2016 in a 
mostly rural area. The projection is presented below in Figure 8. The figure also repre-
sents the effects for the year 2011, which is used as a reference. 
 
Figure 8. Projected effects of a major power disruption in the studied network for years 
2016 and 2011. (adapted from [63, p. 83]) 
As can be seen from the figure, e.g. the amount of operational secondary substations 
during the worst phase of the situation would still be less than 50 % in 2016. Hence it is 
clear, that despite the DSOs’ efforts to improve the reliability of their networks, a storm 
similar to the Tapani-Hannu would still have significant effects. 
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120 132 144
S
er
v
ic
e 
le
v
el
 (
%
)
Duration from the beginning of the disruption (hours)
Secondary substations Secondary substations 2011
Mobile network base stations Mobile network base stations 2011
Customer supply Customer supply 2011
Emergency calls Emergency calls 2011
29 
4.2.2 Causes and effects in an urban DSO’s network 
As mentioned earlier, weather conditions are usually not the most common source of 
major power disruptions in urban DSOs’ networks. Instead, human errors or defects in 
design are the more likely causes. [64], [65] In an urban area, the outages are typically 
considerably shorter and rarer than in rural areas. It is typical that the whole situation 
originates from a single fault in the network, which causes an outage for thousands of 
customers. Therefore, for example, prioritization is not usually a key issue as sufficient 
resources are usually available unlike in the case of a rural DSO. However, locating and 
repairing the fault may take some time, since the networks in urban areas often consist 
mostly of underground cables.  
In an urban area, even a shorter outage situation can be classified as a major power dis-
ruption as it often has significant effects on businesses, industry and public services. For 
example public transportation and the operation of corporate headquarters and govern-
ment agencies may be interrupted. [60, pp. 12-14] Moreover, faults and especially major 
power disruptions are so uncommon in urban networks that the personnel may lack the 
routine to cope with the situation. Hence, the requirements and preferences for fault 
management are likely to differ from those of rural DSOs’. Overall, fault management 
is often considered a lower priority by urban DSOs than rural DSOs. Due to this, fault 
management is mostly discussed from a rural DSO’s perspective in this thesis. 
4.3 The progress of a general fault management process 
Fault management is a key part of the network operation process. The other main func-
tions of the network operation process include network state monitoring and control, 
operation planning and execution of planned maintenance operations. [4, pp. 231-232] 
Typically, the NCC is responsible for carrying out most, if not all, of these tasks. The 
general fault management process is depicted below in Figure 9. [66, pp. 31-33] 
 
Figure 9. The general fault management process. 
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While most of the phases depicted in Figure 9 apply for both MV- and LV-fault man-
agement, the process is somewhat different for MV- and LV-faults. Therefore the gen-
eral progress of the processes will be discussed separately in the two following chapters. 
4.3.1 MV-faults 
Since MV-faults usually cause an outage for a greater amount of customers compared to 
LV-faults, MV-fault management is normally prioritized over LV-fault management. 
The process is typically initiated when a protective relay trips a circuit breaker after 
detecting a fault and the operator is alarmed via SCADA. However, high impedance 
earth faults may not be detected by the relay protection and in such cases the process is 
initiated only after the NCC is informed about the fault via e.g. customer calls.  After 
possible auto-reclosings, the operator acknowledges the fault and analyses the situation 
based on the information available from the IT-systems and his/her experience. If fault 
location information is available via e.g. DMS, it is utilized in the fault isolation pro-
cess. Experienced operator can also often make an educated guess of the possible fault 
location, based on his/her knowledge. With a reliable and precise fault location infor-
mation, the fault isolation process is straightforward and can be performed swiftly. 
However, the fault location is often unknown and the operator has to carry out experi-
mental switchings, first using the RCDs available and then guiding the field crews to 
operate the manual disconnectors. Experimental switching is a method to locate the 
faulty zone by opening disconnectors along the feeder and then closing the circuit 
breaker to see if it trips or not. Using this method, the faulty zone is eventually located. 
Two experimental switching procedures are commonly used; the zone by zone rolling 
and the bisection method. [66, pp. 37-43] 
In zone by zone rolling method, all the RCDs along the feeder that border the remote-
controlled zones are opened. The operator then proceeds by energizing the zones one by 
one, starting from the beginning of the feeder, until the feeding circuit breaker trips. To 
reduce the amount of customers affected by the eventually tripping circuit breaker, con-
firmed healthy parts of the network may be transferred to another feeder. When using 
the zone by zone rolling method, it is necessary to ensure the making capacity of the 
disconnectors used, since they might be closed under fault. The advantage of this meth-
od is that the feeding circuit breaker trips only once, reducing the amount of short out-
ages experienced by customers and the stress caused to the network by the short-circuit 
current. However, there is also a downside as this method is slow, especially in feeders 
with a lot of RCDs and in networks with slow field communications. For this reason, 
the isolation process is commonly started with the bisection method and then the zone 
by zone rolling is used. In the bisection method, the operator chooses an RCD located 
somewhere in the middle part of the unsupplied feeder and divides it roughly in half. 
The circuit breaker is then closed and if the breaker stays closed, the faulted zone is 
located downstream from the opened RCD. The faulted zone is usually confirmed by 
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closing the bordering RCD and checking if the circuit breaker trips, ensuring that the 
fault is indeed located in the suspected zone. Otherwise the fault is located upstream 
from the opened RCD and supply can be restored to the downstream network via adja-
cent feeders, if available. This operation may be performed a few times and then the 
isolation process is continued with the zone by zone rolling. Compared to the zone by 
zone rolling, bisection method is faster but often causes multiple short outages to cus-
tomers. Additional stress is also caused by the short-circuit current that flows through 
the network multiple times, which may result in a conductor break if the conductors are 
not allowed to cool down between the switchings. Hence, a combination of both meth-
ods is often used. [67, pp. 51-53], [66, pp. 39-43] 
After the faulty section has been isolated remotely, the operator dispatches a field crew 
to continue the isolation with the manual disconnectors. Although both of the previously 
described methods can be utilized also in the manual isolation process, usually the bi-
section method is used in practice, since zone by zone rolling would be too slow. [67, p. 
53] After the fault has been isolated, the field crew repairs the fault and restores the 
supply for the rest of the customers. Finally, the operator is responsible for restoring the 
network to the normal switching state and reporting the fault The DMS is typically an 
essential tool in fault reporting, especially for larger DSOs. 
An example of the progress of an actual MV-fault management process from the aspect 
of unsupplied customers and power during the process is presented below in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Unsupplied customers and power as a function of time during an actual MV-
fault management process. 
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Figure 10 represents an actual MV-fault management process during a fault situation in 
a rural DSO’s network. Different phases of the process are also illustrated in the figure.  
In addition to the restoration operations, customer notification can be seen as an addi-
tional part of the fault management process. In section 59 of chapter 6, the Electricity 
Market Act obliges DSOs to promptly inform their customers about ongoing faults and 
also an estimation of the fault duration has to be given. [17] Therefore the operator has 
to update the estimated durations to the IT-systems (often DMS) during the fault man-
agement process, which are then provided for customers, utilizing e.g. web outage maps 
and SMS messages. 
4.3.2 LV-faults 
Due to a more limited geographical extent and lower level of automation in LV-
networks, the fault management process for LV-faults is somewhat different than for 
MV-faults. Although most of the phases depicted in Figure 9 are also present in LV-
fault management, they are handled by different actors.  
Traditionally there have been no remote indication of faults in the LV-network and the 
fault management process was almost always initiated by a disturbance call from a cus-
tomer experiencing an outage or appliance failures. This has changed in the recent 
years, since the government decree on reporting and measuring electricity delivery [68] 
defined that, by the end of 2013, at least 80 % of the consumption sites must be 
equipped with an AMR device. Today many DSOs receive spontaneous alarms from 
AMR devices and the LV-faults can be repaired even before the customer notices any-
thing. 
Today, the operators typically send remote queries to the AMR devices in the presuma-
bly faulted LV-network via e.g. DMS to determine whether there is actually a fault in 
the LV-network or if the fault is in customer’s own systems. After the LV-network has 
been determined faulty, a field crew is dispatched to handle the repairs. The LV-fault 
management does not require significant effort from the operator, since the field crews 
may perform LV-switching operations on their own and there is no need to instruct the 
field crews as was the case with MV-faults. Additionally, the fault reporting is also typ-
ically handled by the field crew. In some cases, the NCC does not participate in the LV-
fault management process at all. 
 
4.3.3 Electrical safety during fault management 
The environmental conditions are often difficult during fault management and those 
involved in fault management are typically in a rush, especially during a major power 
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disruption. Even so, safety issues must be considered in compliance with the standard 
SFS 6002 “Safety at electrical work”. This standard has been approved by Tukes, the 
electrical safety authority in Finland and by applying the instructions found in the 
standard, the requirements set by the Electrical Safety Act are met. [69, p. 5], [70], [71] 
This chapter briefly discusses the basic and most important safety issues and perspec-
tives that must be considered during fault management. 
According to SFS 6002, the operator is responsible for the safe operation of an electrical 
installation during electrical work. [69, p. 10] Therefore an operator’s situational aware-
ness must be at a high level, since during a major power disruption, there are typically 
numerous work locations and multiple field crews in each location, possibly from mul-
tiple different contractors. Due to this reason, MV-switching operations in the field 
must be approved by the operator before they are carried out. Also a work permit must 
be given by the operator before the field crew may proceed with any repair work. To 
avoid misunderstandings, the instructions and orders given by the operator must be 
short and clear. Typically the field crew acknowledges the orders by repeating them for 
the operator over the phone. [72] According to SFS 6002, electrical work may not 
begin/must be stopped if adverse environmental conditions are present (e.g. heavy fog, 
lightning, heavy rain, strong wind). [69, p. 24] Due to this, repair work often cannot be 
started during the first hours of a major power disruption. Before beginning with the 
electrical work, five important safety rules should be applied to ensure that the work 
location is dead. [69, p. 25] These five rules, defined by SFS 6002 are: 
• Complete disconnection 
• Blocking of the reconnection of voltage 
• Verification of absence of voltage of the installation 
• Work earthing 
• Protection against live parts in the vicinity 
To ensure that the safety rules are applied at the work site, a person in control of work 
activity must be nominated. This person is typically a member of the field crew dis-
patched to the location and is responsible for the electrical safety on site. [69, pp. 11, 
55-56] From the point of view of legislation, there are no differences regarding electri-
cal safety during a major power disruption and a normal situation. Therefore e.g. tempo-
rary repairs must comply with all regulations that are applied during a normal situation. 
[73, pp. 71-74] Especially during major power disruptions, it is necessary to ensure that 
both operators and field crews have sufficient amount of resting time as fatigue has been 
proven to predispose to mistakes that lead to safety hazards. [73, p. 74] Finally, accord-
ing to [73, p. 23], lack of routine may also affect electrical safety if the persons partici-
pating in fault management are not regularly involved with electrical safety related is-
sues. Therefore, regular revision and training should be required from all personnel par-
ticipating in fault management.  
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5. MICROSCADA PRO DMS600 
The DMS600 is a part of ABB’s MicroSCADA Pro product family. The other products 
in the family are SYS600 and SYS600C. SYS600 (later, MicroSCADA) is the tradi-
tional SCADA system, used for real-time monitoring and control of the primary and 
secondary equipment in the network. The SYS600C is a solid-state computer that utiliz-
es information distributed in different locations. It can be used as a communication 
gateway in e.g. primary substations or as a completely redundant control system with a 
preinstalled SYS600. [74, pp. 20-25] 
The two main applications of DMS600 are DMS600 Network Editor (NE) and DMS600 
Workstation (WS). From a system point of view, DMS600 NE acts as a Network In-
formation System but is an integral part of the DMS600 product. However, DMS600 
can be alternatively integrated with Network Information Systems from other vendors. 
Integration with other vendors’ SCADA systems is also possible, using OPC Data Ac-
cess interface, although the smoothest operation is achieved with MicroSCADA. With 
MicroSCADA, it is also possible to use the older SCIL-API interface. Numerous licens-
es and sublicenses can be chosen to unlock more functionalities. The chosen license 
also defines the dimensions of the network database (maximum network size in terms of 
components). The DMS600 software runs on Microsoft Windows environment and rela-
tional database servers are used to store data (e.g. Oracle and Microsoft SQL Server). 
DMS600 commonly uses two databases: the network database and DMS database. Stat-
ic network component data is stored in the network database and the DMS database 
contains e.g. dynamic switching state information and outage report data. The system 
also supports hot-standby with a replication feature. [75]  
DMS600 system also includes two background applications that are used for running 
server-side functionalities; DMS600 Server Application (SA) and DMS600 Service 
Framework. The server application is mainly used to serve communication between 
DMS600 and MicroSCADA, when using SCIL-API interface. When using SCIL-API, 
DMS600 SA handles, for example, all switching state updates, measurements, alarms 
and sends fault data from MicroSCADA to DMS600 WS. The Service Framework mon-
itors the background modules that are used in DMS600 environment. [76, pp. 79-85] 
The main modules running over the Service Framework are: 
• OPC Client 
• Outage Info Sender 
• Topo Component 
• Fault Service 
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The OPC client handles the communication between DMS600 and the used SCADA 
system, when SCIL-API is not used. This is the recommended configuration and can be 
used with any compatible OPC DA server to integrate other vendor’s SCADA systems 
with DMS600. [75, pp. 25-26] The Outage Info Sender is a module that automatically 
monitors the real-time outage data based on received socket messages and generates an 
XML file containing network outage information. This file can then be used to provide 
outage notification services for DSO’s customers. An example of this is presented later 
in Figure 14. The used socket messages are sent by Topo Component, which is a mod-
ule that monitors the switching state of the network and updates unsupplied transform-
ers to the database. Finally, the Fault Service is a module that monitors the OPC inter-
face between the used SCADA and DMS600. It detects circuit breaker trips and creates 
fault packages that are required to initiate fault management in DMS600 WS. These 
fault packages contain information regarding e.g. the tripped circuit breaker, fault type, 
event time stamps and measured fault current. [76, pp. 83-84] If SCIL-API is used, the 
fault packages are created by DMS600 SA. Alternatively, DMS600 SA can also be con-
figured to create the fault packages when using OPC interface. [24, pp. 53-55] In addi-
tion to the aforementioned modules, there are also numerous other modules that can be 
run over the service framework. These are often DSO-specific and can be used as an 
interface between the DMS and e.g. external NIS and WMS. 
Henceforth, this chapter focuses mainly on DMS600 WS and the features of DMS600 
NE and the background applications are not discussed further. An overview of the main 
functions is first provided in chapter 5.1 and later on, the fault management functions 
are introduced in more detail. 
5.1 Main functions of DMS600 WS 
The DMS600 WS extends the traditional features of SCADA with a large variety of 
functions. The main operational functions are listed below with the most important fea-
tures bolded: 
• Network topology management 
• Network protection and analysis 
• AMR Integration for LV-network management 
• Operation planning and management of maintenance outages 
• Fault management 
• Data analysis 
To fully exploit some of the features, a corresponding license has to be acquired and 
also a certain level of network automation integrated with the system is required. [75, p. 
59] The DMS600 WS contains a Graphical User Interface (GUI), which is presented in 
Figure 11. In the figure, a geographical network window with a topological coloring 
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selected is visible, along with a diagram presentation of a primary substation. General 
toolbar for the most commonly used features is also visible and the connection statuses 
with databases and other components are shown in a separate status bar on the right. 
 
Figure 11. GUI of DMS600 WS with windows for geographical network view, substa-
tion diagram and network overview visible. 
The view can be customized by the user to best suit his/her needs. From the toolbar, the 
coloring of the network can be quickly switched to check for e.g. constraint violations 
in the network. The user-defined visual presentation of the network is a core function in 
topology management.  
Overall, DMS600 WS can be operated in 7 different modes: 
• State monitoring mode 
• Offline mode 
• Disturbance mode 
• Simulation mode 
• Switching planning mode 
• Automatic Fault Isolation and Restoration mode 
• Optimization mode 
During real time state monitoring, power flow calculations are continuously run on the 
background. The topology of the network is updated if new switching state information 
is received from SCADA or when the user operates manual switching components in 
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DMS600 WS. In offline mode, the OPC interface is disabled and switching states are 
not updated automatically. The disturbance mode may be used in e.g. major power dis-
ruption, since it enhances the performance of DMS600 WS by disabling some function-
alities. The simulation mode can be used for analysis based on historical events or fore-
casted load data. For example switching states can be saved in state monitoring mode 
and then loaded in simulation mode for later analysis. Switching sequences can be 
planned and recorded in switching planning mode and in automatic fault isolation and 
restoration mode, the system automatically initiates fault location, isolation and restora-
tion procedure. Finally, optimization mode can be used for network reconfiguration to 
reduce power losses. [77, pp. 75-76] 
Since this thesis focuses on fault management, it is not reasonable to discuss all features 
of the system that are not related to the main topic. The fault management functions 
available in the latest released version of DMS600 (4.4 Feature Pack 1 Hotfix 3) are 
introduced in the following chapters. 
5.2 Fault management in DMS600 WS 
DMS600 WS contains functions for both MV- and LV-fault management. However, the 
LV-fault management functionalities are mostly limited to reporting and displaying 
AMR events, alarms and measurements. The MV-fault management provides a wider 
range of functionalities and MV-fault management is one of the core features of 
DMS600 WS. Hence, this chapter focuses mainly on the MV-fault management in 
DMS600 WS. In MV-fault management, the main functions are: 
• Fault location 
• Fault isolation and restoration 
• Field crew management 
• Customer service and notification 
• Fault reporting and archiving 
Overview of the fault management interfaces is presented in Figure 12. The fault man-
agement window on the top right is used to manage the ongoing faults. It shows the 
ongoing faults and information regarding them (e.g. starting time, faulted feeder, fault 
current, fault state etc.) and most of the fault management functions are used through 
this interface. It is also possible to define fault handling areas, in which case only the 
faults originating from the selected fault handling area(s) are visible in the fault man-
agement interface. This function can be used in e.g. major power disruption situation, 
where the fault handling responsibilities might be divided to several operators, based on 
geographical areas. The further information presented in the outage information window 
(top-left in Figure 12) can be configured by the user. 
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Figure 12. Overview of the fault management interfaces in DMS600 WS. 
In Figure 12, information regarding the cost of Non-Delivered Energy (NDE), outage 
duration and number of unsupplied customers is shown but other information could also 
be presented. The disturbance call window aids the operator in managing customer calls 
and information regarding the caller can be found quickly using this feature. The differ-
ent fault management functionalities and their principles of operation are discussed with 
more detail in corresponding chapters below.  
5.2.1 Fault location 
The current fault location function of DMS600 WS can be utilized with permanent 
faults in neutral isolated, compensated or neutral earthed networks with radial operation. 
The fault location is determined based on  
• Fault distance calculation 
• Fault detector data 
• Line section types (overhead line/underground cable) 
• Overloading conditions for network components 
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Fault distance calculation requires measured fault current or impedance data from the 
protective relay. Although calculation for both short-circuits and earth-faults is support-
ed, earth-faults are often not located due to lack of accurate reactance measurements, 
especially in compensated networks. Since compensated networks are becoming in-
creasingly common in Finland, the current fault distance calculation is mostly not feasi-
ble for earth faults in Finnish distribution networks. If the calculation is successful, the 
location is pinpointed on the map as a lightning bolt (illustrated in Figure 12). Since 
distribution network is often branched, multiple points with calculated fault current or 
reactance matching the measured value may be found. This problem is also visible in 
Figure 12, with multiple lightning bolts displayed on the map. [75, pp. 78-80] 
It is possible to integrate remote-readable fault indicators with DMS600 WS to over-
come the aforementioned problem. It is also possible to implement on-site readable fault 
detectors but then the detector states have to be updated manually from the DMS600 
WS interface. The state of the fault indicator is displayed on the map to help the opera-
tor in determining the fault location. In addition, the indicator information affects the 
system’s own inference logic, which is based on the calculated fault distance and the 
fault indicator states. The line section types and overloading of network components 
also have an effect on the inference logic. [75, pp. 78-80] The inference system utilizes 
fuzzy logic and its extension, fuzzy sets to combine the aforementioned information. In 
fuzzy logic, the truth value of a variable may be any real number between 0 and 1, 
whereas in Boolean logic, the truth value may be only 0 or 1. Fuzzy sets have elements 
that have a certain degree of membership between 0 and 1. In the inference model, this 
degree of membership is calculated for each unsupplied zone, using specific user-
defined certainty factors for different types of information. These certainty factors have 
to be set carefully, as they affect the inferencing results significantly. Typically the cer-
tainty factors for calculated fault distance and fault indicator data are set highest as they 
are generally more reliable and act as a basis for the inferencing process. [66, pp. 23-
28,79-86], [67, pp. 43-48] More information on the research behind the modelling is 
available in [66] and [67].  
After calculating the likelihoods for each unsupplied zone, the system then further de-
termines the faulted zone, based on the calculated likelihoods and limits set by the user. 
A lower limit for the faulted zone has to be set, along with an upper limit for the healthy 
zones. These limits must be met to allow for a “definite” location of the fault. An exam-
ple is presented in Figure 13, where the aforementioned limits have been set to 0.5 and 
0.3. Since the likelihood of the most probable zone is 0.55 and all other zones have like-
lihoods of 0.15, the zone with likelihood of 0.55 is chosen as the fault location. [75, pp. 
78-80] 
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Figure 13. Calculated likelihoods of faultiness for remote-controlled zones. 
This “definite” fault location is utilized in the automatic fault isolation and restoration 
feature which is described in the following chapter. 
5.2.2 Fault isolation and restoration 
The fault isolation and restoration function provides support for planning the isolation 
and restoration switchings in a fault situation. To enable the use of this function, a fault-
ed zone must be ‘definitely’ determined, either automatically by the previously de-
scribed inference logic or manually by the user. Based on the determined fault location, 
the system generates a switching sequence to isolate the fault and to restore supply to as 
many remote-controlled zones as possible. Constraints for technical limits and protec-
tion are taken into account while generating the sequence. These constraints include e.g. 
voltage drops, detection ability to overcurrent and load levels. The limits for each con-
straint can be defined from the settings. After the sequence has been generated, it can be 
executed either manually by the operator or automatically with MicroSCADA, permit-
ting automatic fault isolation and restoration. [75, pp. 80-81] 
In automatic fault isolation and restoration mode, the created switching sequences are 
sent to MicroSCADA, which checks the acceptability of the sequence (e.g. whether the 
switching devices included in the sequence can be operated) and then either begins to 
execute the sequence or rejects it. The automatic execution of the sequence may be 
started either automatically or after operator’s approval. If a sequence is rejected by 
MicroSCADA, DMS600 WS attempts to generate a new sequence that excludes the 
unaccepted switching devices. Otherwise MicroSCADA begins to execute the sequence 
step-by-step. If any step could not be executed successfully, the process is aborted. Cur-
rently, the automatic fault isolation and restoration mode can only manage one fault at a 
time and is only applicable with MicroSCADA Pro SYS600 or its predecessor SYS500 
version 8.4.2 or higher. [75, p. 81], [77, pp. 155-158] 
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5.2.3 Field crew management 
Field crew management function is used to display the field crews on the map, accord-
ing to their current location. This allows for more efficient guiding of field crews when 
operating manual disconnectors during fault management. The locations can be main-
tained automatically using GPS data or by manually setting their location. Other infor-
mation regarding the field crew can also be stored in the system. This information may 
include the names of the crew members, their training, phone numbers and the equip-
ment the crew has with them. The data content of the field crews in the database can be 
expanded according to the user’s needs. [75, p. 89], [77, pp. 98-101] 
Currently, the field crew management is actually a separate function from the fault 
management interface and these functions are not integrated with each other. However, 
it is possible to keep track of the field crew dispatched to a certain fault by using the 
free text field for field group in the fault management interface. 
5.2.4 Customer service and notification 
In case of a disturbance call, the customer service function allows for quick search for 
information and location of the customer, based on name, customer code or other in-
formation available. The information is based on customer data from the network data-
base. With this function, it is also possible to browse the customer’s interruption and 
call history. Information provided by the customer can be added to the disturbance data 
form to be used in the fault management process (e.g. fault location). These appear as 
“findings” in DMS600 WS. [75, p. 86], [77, pp. 106-110] The disturbance data form 
feature was originally developed for export customers as they had need for a simple 
customer service feature. Finnish DMS600 customers mainly use external systems for 
these purposes but importing findings from them is also possible. 
DMS600 WS offers multiple customer notification functionalities via the Outage Info 
Sender module. The module provides information for e.g. web outage maps on the 
DSOs’ websites and SMS-messages that are used to inform customers about ongoing 
faults. SMS messages can be sent automatically to unsupplied customers after a fault 
has been detected or manually from the fault management interface. The content of the 
messages can be predefined or manually typed for each case. Usually at least the status 
of the fault management process and an estimation of the duration is provided, accord-
ing to the obligations of the Electricity Market Act. An example of a web outage map of 
a DMS600 customer is presented in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Web outage map of a certain DMS600 customer. 
The estimated duration and fault status that are displayed on the outage map are also 
updated from the fault management interface. In addition, the DMS600 WS can be inte-
grated with a telephone answering machine (TAM) to automatically generate a voice 
message containing the fault status and the estimated duration. [75, p. 90] 
5.2.5 Fault reporting and archiving 
Due to the extensive reporting requirements from the Energy Authority and Finnish 
Energy, the fault reporting functionality is one of the most important functions of 
DMS600 WS. The fault reports can be utilized to manage comprehensive information 
regarding the occurred faults. The reports typically include information regarding: 
• The duration of the fault (starting times, ending times, breaks) 
• The name and code of the faulted feeder and primary substation 
• Number of customers and secondary substations affected by the fault 
• Non-delivered energy, customer hours 
• Switching actions executed during the fault 
• The actual fault location 
• Information required by the energy authority (interruption type, fault reason) 
• Other information regarding e.g. the fault type, fault current and the persons re-
sponsible for handling the fault 
In each fault report, the fault is divided into smaller outage areas based on the outage 
duration in each area. These areas together form the key figures for the whole fault. 
Most of the information listed above is generated automatically after the fault has been 
repaired and the report management initiated. However, some information has to be 
43 
filled in manually. It is also possible to create the reports entirely manually. Faults can 
be reported immediately after a fault has been repaired or later through the fault list. 
Some information (e.g. the actual location of the fault) can be added to the reports even 
during a fault. [75, pp. 87-88], [77, pp. 194-204] 
The report management interface is presented in Figure 15. All fault reporting function-
alities are included in the interface. Separate tabs for reviewing and editing the outage 
areas, additional data and fault location are available but they are used through the re-
port management interface. The “additional data” tab contains most of the information 
that has to be filled in manually and includes information regarding e.g. the faulted 
feeder, interruption type, fault reason and environmental conditions. The “fault loca-
tion” tab is used to add the exact fault location to the report manually by pointing the 
location on the map. 
 
 
Figure 15. Report management interface of DMS600 WS. 
After a fault has been reported, it is moved to the fault archives. Historical faults can be 
reviewed through the archives. The switching state is saved in the beginning of each 
fault and the historical faults can be re-opened in simulation mode. This enables later 
simulations and examinations of historical faults. In addition to MV faults, the archives 
also contain reports for reclosings, LV-faults and maintenance outages. In case of an 
LV-fault, the report has to be created manually and most of the information has to be 
filled in by the user. However, LV-faults are often not reported by operators using 
DMS600 WS. Instead they are imported from e.g. WMS, where the information has 
been filled in by the field crew. [75, pp. 87-88], [77, pp. 194-204] 
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In addition to the fault reporting functionalities in DMS600 WS, more extensive report-
ing tools are available with the reporting services of DMS600. The reporting services 
are an external browser based tool that are used for generating e.g. the annual authority 
reports for the Energy Authority. The reporting services use the DMS600 databases and 
any information from the databases can be extracted to generate different types of with 
the Structured Query Language (SQL). 
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6. FAULT SIMULATIONS 
Despite many fault management functions available, not all of them are actively used, 
according to previous customer feedback. Therefore two functions were chosen for a 
more thorough testing and examination; the fault location function and the automatic 
fault isolation and restoration function. Currently, the automatic fault isolation and res-
toration is not actively used by any of the DMS600 WS customers. Also, since the fault 
location functionality forms the basis for the operation of the automatic sequence, it was 
also chosen for testing. The operation and feasibility of these functions were tested in an 
actual network environment by carrying out fault simulations. The simulations were run 
in the copied environments of two DMS600 WS customers. The network and DMS da-
tabases of these two customers were imported in February 2017 to allow for the re-
simulation and examination of the most recent faults. In addition to the Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) of DMS600 WS, data was also gathered straight from the databases, 
utilizing queries with Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio, which is a GUI tool 
for configuring, managing and administering the components within the SQL Server.  
The data gathered from the simulations was also used to estimate the potential benefit 
available from the use of automatic fault isolation and restoration function. Based on the 
simulations, a rough estimate for the cost savings in terms of KAH-value was calculat-
ed. The results of the simulations were also presented to the DSOs representatives dur-
ing the interviews discussed in chapter 7. Based on their expertise, they were asked to 
evaluate if the results and conclusion were in fact realistic and consistent with their ex-
periences. 
The simulations carried out to examine the fault location function are discussed in chap-
ter 6.1 and the testing of the automatic fault isolation and restoration function is re-
viewed in chapter 6.2, respectively. Chapter 6.3 discusses the potential benefits of the 
automatic fault isolation and restoration. The DSO feedback regarding the simulations 
is discussed later in chapter 7.1. 
6.1 Fault location simulations 
The aim of the fault location simulations was to evaluate the efficiency and accuracy of 
the current fault location function. The information gathered was also used in projecting 
the possible financial benefits available from the use of automatic fault isolation and 
restoration. Fault location simulations were first carried out by simulating the actual 
MV-faults from the fault archives of a rural DSO, using the simulation mode of the 
DMS600 WS. The original idea was to repeat the simulations in the environments of 
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two other rural DSOs. Fault archives for the year 2016 were used in the simulations, 
since it was the most recent complete archive available for DSO 1 and DSO 2. However 
the third DSO’s environment could not be imported from the DSO’s server and hence 
the simulations were to be carried out using the two environments available. When us-
ing the environment of DSO 2, it was quickly determined that there is no fault current 
data available from majority of the primary substations of DSO 2. Since DSO 2 also had 
no fault indicators installed, this meant that the fault location function would not be able 
to determine the fault location effectively in DSO 2’s environment. Hence, it was not 
reasonable to proceed further with DSO 2’s environment and only the environment of 
DSO 1 was used. Some key figures regarding the 2016 fault archives of DSOs 1 and 2 
are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Key figures from the 2016 fault archives of DSOs 1 and 2. 
Quantity DSO 1 DSO 2 
Total faults (pcs.) 1048 898 
Short-circuits (pcs. / % of total) 918 / 87.6 571 / 63.6 
Earth faults (pcs. / % of total) 129 / 12.3 326 / 36.3 
Other faults (pcs. / % of total) 1 / 0.1 1 / 0.1 
Percentage of faults with 𝐼𝑘 > 100 𝐴 (%) 20.4 2.2 
 
The previously described problem with DSO 2’s environment is reflected in Table 3, 
where the percentage of faults with fault current higher than 100 A is visible. With the 
percentage being 2.2 %, it is clear that there are not many faults that can be located with 
the fault distance calculation. Even in the case of DSO 1, majority of the faults had fault 
current of 0 A. This means that there is no fault current measurement data attached to 
the fault report and so it is certain that in these cases the fault distance calculation is 
unable to locate the fault, since there were also no fault impedance measurements avail-
able. Thus, only short-circuit faults were considered but even then there were a lot of 
faults left, having fault currents of less than 100 A. In these cases the fault current data 
may not have been available at the time, the fault type may have been defined incorrect-
ly (e.g. earth fault as a short-circuit) or there may have been some measurement or scal-
ing errors. Whatever the reason, in these cases the fault current on the report does not 
correspond to reality and therefore the fault distance calculation is unable to determine 
the fault location. Hence, to reduce the number of simulations required, a rough lower 
limit for the fault current was experimentally determined. Based on the experiments, it 
was determined that in the environment of DSO 1, faults having fault current of less 
than 350 A cannot be located with the fault distance calculation and hence, only faults 
with fault current higher than 350 A were thoroughly examined. Using this limitation, 
there were 204 faults that were re-simulated from the 2016 archives. 
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DSO 1 had a few remote-readable fault indicators installed but the historical statuses of 
the fault indicators are not written in the database when the fault is reported and ar-
chived and therefore they do not operate when re-simulating the faults. Thus, in these 
simulations, it was assumed that the fault indicators always operated correctly and their 
states were set manually, according to the actual fault location information filled in by 
the operator. If the actual fault location was not available, the indicator states were left 
untouched. Due to the very small amount of installed fault indicators, this should not 
have significant impact on the results. 
Since the fault distance calculation is performed dynamically only when the fault is ac-
tive, neither the calculated fault locations nor the information regarding the status of the 
inference function are written in the fault database. Therefore faults had to be re-
simulated separately one by one from the 2016 archives. Based on the outcome of the 
simulations, different types of information were gathered. These were: 
1. Information regarding whether the fault distance calculation was successful or 
not 
2. Information regarding whether the fault was definitely located or not, according 
to the parameters used 
3. Information regarding the validity of the fault location if the fault was definitely 
located, i.e. if the automatically selected remote-controlled zone was actually 
faulty 
4. Information regarding whether the zone with the highest likelihood was actually 
faulty or not and reversely whether the zone with the lowest likelihood was 
healthy or not 
The first two items do not consider the validity of the performed actions, but only 
whether they could be carried out or not. Validity of the performed actions is considered 
in items 3 and 4, based on the actual fault location filled in by the operator during the 
fault management process. The item 4 was mainly additional information and was col-
lected to study, whether the fault location function could rule out at least one healthy 
zone with high certainty even if it can’t accurately determine the faulted one. This could 
be used e.g. to allow limited automatic restoration to zones that are determined healthy 
with a high certainty. Similarly, the faultiness of the highest likelihood zone was exam-
ined to consider the possibility of configuring the inference logic to always choose the 
highest likelihood zone as the definite fault location. 
The simulations were carried out twice with two different sets of parameters for the in-
ference function. First the default settings from the environment of DSO 1 were used 
and then, according to the results, the parameters were adjusted in order to increase the 
amount of definitely located faults. The parameters for the simulation rounds are pre-
sented below in Table 4. 
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Table 4. The parameters used in the fault location simulations. 
Round Lower limit for the faulted zone Upper limit for other zones 
1 0.8 0.5 
2 0.3 0.3 
 
The faults were classified as “correctly located” if the chosen remote-controlled zone 
contained at least one actual fault location. An example is presented in Figure 16 where 
the yellow highlighted zone has been chosen as the definite fault location. The two stars 
mark the actual fault locations and since they are located within the yellow zone, the 
inference is correct in this case. 
 
Figure 16. An example of a correctly located fault. 
Correspondingly, if the actual fault locations were outside the chosen zone, the fault 
was classified as “incorrectly located”. If there were no actual fault locations available, 
the fault was classified as “fault location unknown”. Also, if multiple fault locations 
were calculated and the inference function was unable to determine the faulted zone 
within the set limits, the fault was classified as “inaccurately located”. 
The results of the simulations with both sets of parameters are presented in Table 5, 
classified as previously described. As can be seen, fault distance could be calculated for 
143 faults, which accounts for 13.6 % of the faults in the 2016 archives of DSO 1. By 
adjusting the parameters, the amount of definitely located faults among these 143 was 
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increased from 96 to 125. The second set of parameters decreased the certainty require-
ments for the likelihoods of the zones and therefore the amount of both correctly and 
incorrectly located faults was increased, whereas the amount of inaccurately located 
faults was reduced. Among the 1048 faults in the 2016 archives, there were numerous 
cases where the fault had been created manually by the operator to fix SMS and web 
outage notification issues for some customers. In these cases some outage areas had not 
been linked to an ongoing fault in DMS600 WS, in which case another fault has to be 
created manually for these areas to ensure the functioning of outage notification. This 
increases the amount of total faults in the archives and in turn reduces the percentage of 
located faults, since the manually created faults never include fault current data. Hence, 
in practical terms, the fault distance calculation could be performed for slightly more 
than 13.6 % of the faults occurred.  
Table 5. Results of the fault location simulations for the studied set. 
 Parameters 1 Parameters 2 
 Item Pcs. 
% of 
total 
faults 
% of faults 
with 𝐼𝑘 > 
350 A 
Pcs. 
% of 
total 
faults 
% of faults 
with 𝐼𝑘 > 
350 A 
Fault distance calculated 143 13.6 70.1 143 13.6 70.1 
Fault definitely located 96 9.2 47.1 125 11.9 61.3 
Correctly located 45 4.3 22.1 54 5.2 26.5 
Incorrectly located 23 2.2 11.3 35 3.3 17.2 
Inaccurately located 36 3.4 17.6 15 1.4 7.4 
Unknown fault location 39 3.7 19.1 39 3.7 19.1 
Not located 61 5.8 29.9 61 5.8 29.9 
 
The inference function was able to choose the correct zone in most cases where the fault 
was definitely located. However, most of the feeders only consisted of a few (2-4) re-
mote-controlled zones, which increased the chances of choosing the correct zone, even 
if the calculated locations did not accurately match the actual fault location. I.e. it is 
likely that increasing the amount of RCDs in the network would likely result in less 
faults being correctly located. In addition, there were also a few feeders with no remote-
controlled switching devices installed, i.e. the feeder consisted of only one zone and 
therefore the chosen zone was automatically correct. Even in the used environment, 
many faults were also incorrectly located. The most common reason for this was that, 
although one of the calculated locations was fairly accurate, there were multiple other 
calculated locations in different zones, which caused DMS600 WS to choose incorrect-
ly. There were also some cases where none of the calculated locations were anywhere 
near the actual fault location. In these cases the fault current was either incorrect or the 
operator had not marked all fault locations to the report. 
Of the studied set of 204 faults, 45 were correctly located with parameters 1 and 54 with 
parameters 2. Even with the adjusted parameters, only around 5 % of the total annual 
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MV-faults could be located correctly and definitely, which already prevents wide utili-
zation of the current automatic fault isolation and restoration function, since definite 
fault location is required. The calculated fault locations however do provide the operator 
with useful information of possible fault locations, of which the operator might be able 
to determine the correct one, based on his/her experience and intuition. 
Furthermore, there were still 61 faults in the studied set of 204 faults that could not be 
located using the fault distance calculation, which accounts for roughly 30 % of the 
studied set. A common reason for the failure of the calculation was incorrect fault cur-
rent. In these cases the fault current was either lower than the lowest possible fault cur-
rent at the end of the feeder or higher than the highest possible fault current at the feed-
ing circuit breaker. This means that there has either been a measurement error at the 
primary substation or the fault current data has distorted somewhere during data transfer 
to the DMS. Another reason for failure was that, in some cases, the network used in the 
simulations did not correspond to the one that existed at the time of the fault. This was a 
result of a later network modification, e.g. adding of a new network section or deleting 
an old one after the fault had been reported and archived. This causes DMS600 WS to 
use the historical switching state in the currently existing network and prevents the use 
of fault distance calculation in re-simulations. 
As was previously described, additional information regarding the actual faultiness of 
the highest likelihood zone and the healthiness of the lowest likelihood zone was also 
gathered during the simulations. This information was gathered for faults that had the 
actual fault location added to the report and consisted of more than one remote-
controlled zone. The rates are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Faultiness and healthiness rates of the highest and lowest likelihood zones. 
Item Pcs. % of studied set 
Actual fault located in the zone with the highest like-
lihood 
44 48.9 
Actual fault located outside the zone with the lowest 
likelihood 
64 71.1 
Total faults studied 90 100.0 
 
Of the studied set, the actual fault was located in the highest likelihood zone in roughly 
half of the studied cases and most of the lowest likelihood zones were healthy. Howev-
er, the previously described impact regarding the amount of remote-controlled zones 
also applies to these results. Therefore no significant conclusions can be based on these 
results, although it is likely that with high number of remote-controlled zones in a feed-
er, the lowest likelihood zone can be assumed healthy with a fairly good accuracy. On 
the contrary, the accuracy of a fault being actually located in the highest likelihood zone 
were less than 50 % and the rate would be even lower for feeders with high amount of 
remote-controlled zones. Therefore configuring the inference logic to always choose the 
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highest likelihood zone would often result in a circuit breaker trip and aborting of the 
restoration sequence. 
Finally, after a brief comparison between the most recent yearly fault archives of DSO 
1, it was noted that the percentage of faults with fault current higher than 100 A varied 
significantly between years 2012-2016. For example in 2014, the percentage was 2.8 % 
while it was 20.4 % in the 2016 archives, which were used in these simulations. The 
percentages were particularly low in the 2013 and 2014 archives, which indicates that 
significantly smaller amount of fault current data had been transferred to DMS. If these 
archives had been used in these simulations, the results would have likely been different 
and especially the percentage of located faults would have been considerably smaller. 
However, it is likely that this issue was mainly resulting from configuration changes to 
the DMS Fault Service during 2013-2014 and was therefore temporary. 
6.2 Testing of the automatic fault isolation and restoration 
To evaluate the operation of the automatic fault isolation and restoration function, an-
other set of simulations was carried out in the environment of DSO 1. In this case, the 
simulations were not directly based on historical faults and instead the faults were creat-
ed manually. The testing was carried out for 20 different feeders, consisting of at least 
three remote-controlled zones. For each feeder, the location of the faulted zone was 
manually varied along the feeder so that first the faulted zone was located at the begin-
ning of the feeder, then in the middle section and finally at the end of the feeder. The 
testing was carried out in two different switching states; normal and disturbed. In a 
normal state, there were no other unsupplied feeders that could affect the generation of 
the sequence. In a disturbed state, at least one adjacent feeder that had an open connec-
tion point with the studied feeder was unsupplied. The idea was to simulate a situation 
where multiple faults are simultaneously active in the same geographical area. The un-
supplied adjacent feeder was chosen so that DMS600 WS had used it in the restoration 
sequence for normal state and therefore had to alter the sequence from the previous situ-
ation. An example of a simulation carried out in a disturbed state is presented in Figure 
17. 
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Figure 17. Testing simulation with network in a disturbed state. The studied feeder is 
outlined in red and the adjacent unsupplied feeder in blue. 
In Figure 17 the studied feeder is outlined in red with the yellow highlighted zone con-
taining the fault and the blue outlined feeder is the adjacent one, set unsupplied for dis-
turbed state simulation. The aim of these simulations was to determine, whether the 
switching sequences generated are feasible in different situations. The percentage of 
restored customers in each case was also determined for later use in evaluating the bene-
fits of automatic fault isolation and restoration. 
The generated sequences were examined manually in each case. The sequences were 
classified as follows: 
Ok = the sequence was rational and all possible healthy zones 
were restored, regarding the technical constraints 
Bad = some constraints were violated or some zones were not re-
stored even though there were no constraint violations 
Other = the sequence restored all zones without constraint violations 
but contained some unnecessary switching operations 
The DSO 1’s default constraint limits were used, which allowed a maximum of 7 % 
voltage drop and a maximum of 100 % load level and short-circuit capacity.  For short-
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circuit and earth fault detection, minimum of 100 % of the corresponding relay setting 
was required. These constraints were checked manually for all cases using the corre-
sponding coloring modes of DMS600 WS. The results for the simulations in both nor-
mal and disturbed states are presented in Table 7 and Table 8. 
Table 7. Results of the testing of the automatic fault isolation and restoration function 
in a normal state. 
  Location of the faulted zone  
Sequence status  Beginning Middle End Total 
Ok 
Pcs. 13 14 19 46 
% 65.0  70.0 95.0 76.7 
Bad 
Pcs. 6 4 0 10 
% 30.0 20.0 0.0 16.7 
Other 
Pcs. 1 2 1 4 
% 5.0 10.0 5.0 6.7 
Total Pcs. 20 20 20 60 
 
Table 8. Results of the testing of the automatic fault isolation and restoration function 
in a disturbed state. 
  Location of the faulted zone  
Sequence status  Beginning Middle End Total 
Ok 
Pcs. 13 16 19 48 
% 65.0 80.0 95.0 80.0 
Bad 
Pcs. 6 3 0 9 
% 30.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 
Other 
Pcs. 1 1 1 3 
% 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Total Pcs. 20 20 20 60 
 
As expected, the generated sequence was feasible in most cases. There were also no 
significant differences in the results between the two network states. Surprisingly, how-
ever, the sequence was incorrect in over 15 % of the studied cases. Apart from one case, 
these were all result of some zone(s) not being included in the restoration sequence, 
even though there were no constraint violations, according to manual check. To deter-
mine the reason for this, the constraint limits were altered but whatever limits were set 
in these cases, the problem wasn’t solved. Since there is no error log available of the 
sequence generation, it is difficult to determine, what prevented the restoration of some 
zones. It was found that the 1 kV network that has been documented in the MV-level in 
DSO 1’s environment, caused the short-circuit detection calculation to operate incor-
rectly. This originated from the 1 kV LV-switches that had been documented as relays 
but no settings were determined for them in DMS600 WS. This caused the coloring 
mode to always present the 1 kV branches in alarm color. Changing the 1 kV relay set-
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tings fixed the issue with the coloring mode but did not affect the generation of the se-
quence in most cases. Even disconnecting the 1 kV branches manually prior to the 
simulations did not solve the problem and for the time being, it remains unclear what is 
causing the described problem. 
The aforementioned problem, however, is not an electrical safety issue that would defi-
nitely prevent the use of the sequence. There was a single case where the generated se-
quence contained switchings that caused an unacceptable voltage drop. In this case the 
network was in in an unaccepted state even before the fault. It was later found that, ac-
cording to loadflow calculations, it is impossible to configure the network to an accept-
ed state in this specific area without altering the primary transformer tap changer set-
tings. None of this, however, explains why the constraint violations were allowed in the 
sequence, since the pre-fault state of the network should not affect the checking for con-
straint violations. There were also a few cases where the sequence was seemingly cor-
rect but included some unnecessary switching operations. It is likely that these result 
from the same previously described issue, where DMS600 WS, for some reason, seems 
to falsely believe that there is a constraint violation and includes so-called “load relief” 
switchings in the sequence. In total, the generated sequence restored supply for 60.5 
percent of the feeder customers on average. 
6.3 Potential benefits of automatic fault isolation and restora-
tion 
In addition to the actual simulations, the potential benefits achievable from the use of 
automatic fault isolation and restoration were studied. The idea was to get some notion 
of the financial benefits achievable and then present the results to the DSOs’ representa-
tives for their evaluation. Since a thorough study of the benefits could solely provide a 
topic for a thesis, the evaluation carried out in this one was kept rough and as compact 
as possible. In practice, this was done by calculating an average reduction in the KAH-
costs per fault using several assumptions based on the fault archive data and the fault 
simulations. The results of the fault location simulations were then used to evaluate the 
achievable benefits on annual basis. 
In order to calculate the reduction in KAH-value, data regarding the amount of average 
customers on a fault and their average disconnected power was gathered from a five-
year period, using the 2012–2016 fault archives of DSO 1 and DSO 2. It was assumed 
that 60.5 % of these customers could be restored using the automatic sequence, based 
on the earlier simulations. The main issue was to determine the time saved with the use 
of the automation. It is likely that in a normal situation where the operator is not over-
burdened with multiple faults, there is little to no benefit available. Instead, the majority 
of the benefits can be achieved in a major power disruption situation, where there may 
be dozens of faults to be managed simultaneously. Therefore an estimation of the time 
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saved was created by comparing the durations of remote isolations made by an operator 
in a normal situation and in a major disruption. However, DMS600 WS includes all 
switching operations occurred anywhere in the network during a fault in the fault report 
switching list. Therefore, during a major power disruption, it is nearly impossible to 
determine all the remote-controlled switching operations that are linked to the studied 
fault, since lots of other switching operations are also being carried out all over the net-
work and these are included in the switching list as well. Due to this, the outage time of 
the first outage area (i.e. zone where supply was restored first) was used for both situa-
tions when comparing the durations. In practice, the outage time of the first outage area 
represents the operator’s response time and the time used to carry out the first successful 
isolation. This data was easily readable from the GUI of DMS600 WS and also straight 
from the database, using simple queries. To ensure that the results were comparable, the 
switching list was used to check that the first isolation was indeed carried out using 
RCDs and not manual disconnectors. 
The Rauli-storm, which occurred on august 27th, 2016 represented a major power dis-
ruption in this study. The data required to compare the durations was gathered from 
DSO 1’s fault archives and Rauli-storm was the worst case in the 2016 archives and was 
therefore chosen for this study. The progress of the situation during the storm is depict-
ed in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. Progress of the major disruption situation during the Rauli-storm in the 
network of DSO 1. 
The busiest time in terms of active faults was between 19:00-21:00, when there were 97 
active faults on average. The new faults that began during this time period were used in 
this study. There were a total of 20 faults having starting time in this period. 14 of these 
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were included in calculating the average isolation time for a major power disruption. 6 
cases were not included because there either was no data available or the first isolation 
had not been carried out with RCDs. In this study, cases where only a single fault was 
active, were used as a normal situation. In these cases the operator could concentrate 
solely on handling that fault and therefore it represents the easiest scenario. Correspond-
ingly to the major power disruption situation, 14 cases having the first outage area iso-
lated with RCDs were randomly selected for the comparison. Two different examples 
were created to evaluate the time differences. In both cases it is assumed that the auto-
matic fault isolation and restoration is always able to carry out the switchings as fast as 
the operator in a normal state. In the first example, the direct difference between the 
durations is used. This represents the time saved during a major power disruption. In the 
second example, it is assumed that the operator’s average duration for the isolation on 
an annual basis would be the average of the two durations (i.e. average of the durations 
in the worst and easiest scenario). This is used to roughly represent the average time 
saved for all faults on an annual basis. 
Since some DSOs do not occupy the NCC during the night, considerable benefits might 
be derived from the use of automation during nighttime. Therefore, a third example was 
also created, where the isolation durations for the faults that began during nighttime 
(22:00-06:00) were gathered and compared to the corresponding durations for faults that 
began during other time (06:00-22:00). In this example, the durations were gathered 
straight from the database and the average was calculated using data from all faults in 
the 2016 archives. The archives of DSO 2 were used in this study, since it was known 
that their NCC is not occupied during the night. The average durations and their differ-
ences for the three examples are presented in Table 9. In examples 1 and 2, duration 1 
represents the time it would take for the automatic sequence to carry out the isolation 
and duration 2 represents the corresponding time for an operator. In example 3 the dura-
tions are considerably longer, since data from all faults was used without manual check. 
This data includes also false cases where the fault was e.g. created for customer notifi-
cation purposes or no switchings were recorded. However, since these false cases are 
present in both durations for example 3, the difference should roughly represent the 
achievable time benefit from the use of automation. 
Table 9. Isolation durations and their differences for three example cases. 
 Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 
Duration 1 0:04:28 0:04:28 0:20:23 
Duration 2 0:10:12 0:07:20 0:28:23 
Difference 0:05:44 0:02:52 0:08:00 
 
The other data used in the evaluation is presented in Table 10. This includes the average 
disconnected power per customer, average customers per fault, restored customers per 
fault and restored power per fault. The restored power is based on the amount of re-
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stored customers and their average disconnected power. Hence, in this evaluation it is 
assumed that the customers and loads are evenly distributed along the feeder. 
Table 10. Additional data used in the evaluation. 
 DSO 1 DSO 2 
Average disconnected power/customer (kW) 0.95 0.91 
Average customers per fault (Pcs.) 388 487 
Restored customers per fault (Pcs.) 235 295 
Restored power per fault (kW) 223.25 268.45 
 
Using the data presented in Table 9 and Table 10, the KAH-benefits for a single fault 
were calculated using Equation (2), which has been derived from Equation (1). This 
equation only considers the energy-dependent part of the KAH-cost, since the use of 
automatic fault isolation and restoration has no effect on the initial disconnected power. 
𝐾𝐴𝐻𝐵 = 𝑃𝑥 × 𝑡𝑦 × 11€/𝑘𝑊ℎ ×
𝐶𝑃𝐼2016
𝐶𝑃𝐼2005
       (2) 
where 
𝐾𝐴𝐻𝐵  = the KAH-benefit 
𝑃𝑥  = restored power for fault x 
𝑡𝑦  = time difference in example y 
𝐶𝑃𝐼2016  = consumer price index of year 2016 
𝐶𝑃𝐼2005  = consumer price index of year 2005 
The calculated KAH-benefits for DSOs 1 and 2 in the three example cases are presented 
in Table 11. The used ratio of the consumer price indexes was 1.198. 
Table 11. Potential KAH-benefits per fault for DSOs 1 and 2 in three example cases. 
 Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 
DSO 1 (€) 281 141 392 
DSO 2 (€) 338 169 472 
 
While these values are only rough estimates, it is clear that the biggest benefits can be 
achieved during a major power disruption or in cases when the NCC is not occupied 
24/7. Based on the values presented in Table 11, the benefits on an annual basis would 
be rather small, using the current logic of DMS600 WS. Only 54 faults were correctly 
located for year 2016 in DSO 1’s environment and therefore, using the average KAH-
benefit value for all faults (example 2), would result in annual benefits of less than 
8 000 €. In addition, since DMS600 WS is currently able to manage only one fault at a 
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time in automatic fault isolation and restoration mode, the amount would be even small-
er. However, adding the ability to manage multiple faults simultaneously and changing 
the isolation and restoration logic to allow experimental switchings when the fault loca-
tion is unknown would greatly increase the feasibility of the function. If, for example, 
all 112 faults that occurred during the nighttime in DSO 2’s network in 2016 could have 
been isolated automatically, they would solely account for a KAH-benefit of over 50 
000€. 
It is also likely that the values presented in Table 11 are at least somewhat underesti-
mated, since load is usually not distributed evenly along the feeders but is instead con-
centrated on the beginning of the feeder. The beginning part of the feeder is often less 
prone to faults (due to e.g. cabled network), and therefore it is likely that the automatic 
isolation and restoration could often restore supply to these higher load concentration 
areas, which would result in higher KAH-benefits per fault. In addition, the power used 
in these evaluations is derived from the non-delivered energy and therefore represents 
the actual disconnected power while the Energy Authority calculates the power based 
on the annual energy consumption of the customers. Since most of the outages occur 
during summertime, for most outages, the actual disconnected power is lower than the 
yearly average. This results in slightly smaller KAH-values in this study, compared to 
the actual KAH-values calculated with equation (1). 
Overall, it proved difficult to accurately evaluate the KAH-benefits, since they are af-
fected by numerous factors. For example the time it takes for an automatic isolation and 
restoration sequence to run depends on the used field communication solution and eval-
uating the duration for operator’s isolation accurately is difficult without tedious manual 
work. However, a conclusion can be drawn that considerable benefits can be achieved 
during major power disruptions and times when the NCC is not occupied but not with 
the current isolation logic, unless significant amount of reliable fault detectors are avail-
able. 
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7. DMS600 CUSTOMER INTERVIEWS 
In order to develop the fault management functions according to the requirements and 
wishes of DMS600 customers, a discussion with the representatives of a few DSOs was 
organized. This insight is valuable in discovering the inadequacies of DMS600 WS. The 
original idea was to organize a joint meeting with multiple DSOs representatives. How-
ever, it proved difficult to find a time that would have suited everyone’s schedule and 
therefore separate interviews were chosen instead. A joint meeting would have provided 
a better platform for collaborative brainstorming but separate interviews offered more 
flexibility and also facilitated more confidential conversations. Three of the largest 
DMS600 customers were asked to participate in the interviews. The three customers are 
all large, rural DSOs according to the classifications described in chapter 2.1. Only rural 
DSOs were chosen for the interviews, since their networks are more prone to faults and 
therefore development of fault management is usually of greater interest to them than 
urban DSOs. The participating DSOs are presented in Figure 19 below. 
• PKS Sähkönsiirto Oy, 
highlighted in red 
 
• Savon Voima Verkko Oy, 
highlighted in yellow 
 
• Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy, 
highlighted in blue 
 
 
Figure 19. Interviewed DMS600 customers and their geographical positioning. 
(Adapted from [78]) 
Multiple DSO representatives were present in each interview, consisting mainly of op-
erations personnel. At least one of the representatives in each interview had solid expe-
rience in working as an NCC operator. A semi-structured interview method was used to 
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carry out the interviews. The participants were provided with a preliminary question-
naire in advance, containing the main themes and a basic structure for the interview. 
This questionnaire is available in Appendix A. However, other fault management-
related topics were also discussed and the interview consisted mainly of open discus-
sion. Hence, the ideas and requirements described by other DSOs’ representatives were 
also discussed with the later interviewed representatives. The interviews and their re-
sults are presented in a chronological order in this chapter. An average duration for an 
interview was roughly 3 hours and the interviews were recorded and transcribed for 
later analysis.  
One of the objectives of this thesis was also to describe the fault management processes 
of the DSOs and therefore they were also discussed in the interviews and are described 
in the following chapters. It was assumed that the DSOs would have at least three dif-
ferent modes of operation for different fault situations; one for single fault situation an-
other for multiple fault situation and a third for major power disruption. It was also as-
sumed that the requirements and needs regarding fault management support functions in 
DMS600 WS would be somewhat different in different modes of operation. Therefore, 
the questionnaire was structured based on these assumptions. The differences in the 
fault management process in each mode and also the reasons behind the transition be-
tween different modes were also discussed. In addition, the DSOs’ representatives were 
asked to briefly evaluate the validity of the simulations and conclusions presented in 
chapter 6, based on their expertise. The DSO feedback regarding the simulations is pre-
sented in chapter 7.1. Each DSO and their fault management processes and development 
requirements and ideas are depicted in the further chapters. Finally, chapter 7.5 summa-
rizes the gathered development ideas and requirements. 
7.1 DSO Feedback regarding the simulations 
The results of the simulations were presented to the representatives of the DSOs prior to 
the actual interviews. The representatives had extensive knowledge of their networks 
and also experience in using DMS600 WS and therefore they were asked to evaluate the 
validity of the results and conclusions based on their expertise. 
All DSOs agreed that calculated fault locations are rarely available and the results of the 
fault location simulations are therefore conclusive. According to them, clear majority of 
the actual fault locations are added to the fault report, even if there are multiple fault 
locations along the same feeder. Therefore, it is likely that most of the incorrect fault 
locations found in this study were a result of DMS600 WS miscalculation rather than 
incorrect or inadequate fault location data. [79], [80], [81] However, when an operator 
is overburdened, during e.g. a major power disruption, it is possible that some fault lo-
cations have not been added to the fault reports. It was also pointed out that the percent-
ages of short-circuit faults and earth faults (e.g. 87.6 % and 12.3 % for DSO 1) are like-
ly false. [79] It is likely that this results from a Fault Service module configuration is-
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sue, where short-circuit has been defined as the default fault type that will be set to all 
faults if fault type information is not received from the relay. There are also several dif-
ferent schemas for different types of relays that are used to interpret the fault data cor-
rectly for DMS600 WS. It is possible that these schemas are either incorrect or missing 
for some relays and therefore the fault data in the DMS database may be at least partial-
ly false or incomplete. Another reason for missing fault data is that DMS600 WS rejects 
some information if it has not been received when a fault is established in the system 
(e.g. when a fault is written to the database). For example a relay may have different 
update intervals for different types of information. Typically state information is critical 
and is therefore transmitted spontaneously within a few milliseconds to DMS600 WS. 
Other information, e.g. fault current measurements and fault types may be updated only 
periodically. Similar delays may also exist in substation RTUs, which further increase 
the total delay. Even if this information is transmitted to the DMS afterwards, it will not 
be written to the database once the fault has been established and is therefore rejected. 
The used estimations for the operator’s isolation durations in different situations were 
generally considered plausible. [79], [80], [81] However, it was pointed out that the 
Rauli-storm, which was used as an example of a major power disruption in this thesis, 
was not the best choice to be used as a worst scenario. According to [79], the situation 
was not very severe for a major power disruption. Using a more severe case in the study 
would have likely resulted in higher calculated benefits due to greater difference in the 
isolation durations. It was also pointed out that it is difficult to generalize the isolation 
durations as the situations differ widely and e.g. the starting time affects the level of 
readiness in each situation. [81] In addition, there were differing opinions regarding the 
estimated difference in the isolation durations during nighttime and office hours. While 
some considered the 8-minute difference as somewhat overestimated, others estimated 
that the actual difference could be even greater. [80], [81] 
While evaluation of the presented savings in KAH-value per fault proved difficult for 
the DSO representatives, the projected annual KAH-savings with the current system 
were generally considered insignificant. [79], [80] The annual KAH-costs for a large 
rural DSO are typically millions of euros and the projected savings with the current sys-
tem account for less than a percent of this total. [79] It was also pointed out that to facil-
itate a more thorough evaluation, the fault cases would have had to be classified more 
specifically, e.g. based on the affected area (town-plan area/not town plan area). The 
used simplification where the load is evenly distributed along the feeder rarely applies 
in reality. [80] 
7.2 PKS Sähkönsiirto Oy 
PKS Sähkönsiirto Oy is a subsidiary of Pohjois-Karjalan Sähkö Oy, which is the parent 
company of the PKS Group. Other subsidiaries are Enerke Oy, Kuurnan Voima Oy and 
SLT-Consults Oy, focusing on technical services and energy production and sales. PKS 
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Sähkönsiirto Oy (later PKS) is responsible for providing distribution network services 
in Eastern Finland, mostly in the North Karelia region. [82] The operating area is large, 
covering over 25 000 km² in roughly 20 municipalities. [83] The operating area of PKS 
is presented in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. The operating area of PKS Sähkönsiirto Oy. [82] 
PKS operates a distribution network of approximately 21 000 km, providing electricity 
for roughly 86 000 customers. [82] Approximately 9800 km of the total network length 
is MV-network and the rest is LV-network. In addition, PKS also operates approximate-
ly 250 km of 110 kV and 60 km of 45 kV regional networks. [8] The North Karelia re-
gion is highly forested, with over 85 % of the land area being covered by forests. [84] 
This makes the network very prone to faults, since the cabling rate of the network is 
also low (less than 4 % for MV-network). [8] 
There are 36 primary substations and approximately 220 feeders. The level of automa-
tion in the network is somewhat low; there are around 700 RCDs in roughly 400 RCD-
stations, which means that, on average, there are around 7 RCDs per 100 km of MV-
network. However, the amount of RCDs is increasing constantly and new sectionalizing 
circuit breakers (SCBs) are also being installed. About 20 remote-readable fault detec-
tors have been installed into the network but the reliability of the devices and the used 
communication solution has been found insufficient. Due to this, there are currently no 
plans to increase the amount of fault detectors. In addition, fault detectors previously 
had no value in the calculated net present value of the network, which has also affected 
the decision to discontinue their installations. [79] However, fault detectors for cabled 
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networks are now included in the net present value for the next two regulatory periods. 
[85] The future strategy to achieving weatherproof network in the beginning and middle 
sections of feeders utilizes cabled network in urban areas and elsewhere the overhead 
lines are placed alongside roads and the 1 kV distribution system is used. The end parts 
will be sectionalized by SCBs to prevent them from causing outages to the weatherproof 
sections. [79] 
The main IT systems integrated with DMS600 in PKS environment are ABB’s Mi-
croSCADA Pro SYS600 (later MicroSCADA) and Power Grid NIS (later PG) by Tieto 
Oyj. In addition, Tieto Care Center (later CaCe) work management system is integrated 
with DMS600 to enable e.g. the flow of LV-fault reports from CaCe to DMS600. Un-
like some DSOs that have acquired communication solutions from external provider, 
PKS uses and maintains its own radio communication network for field communication. 
This applies for both RCDs/SCBs and primary substation communication. 
7.2.1 Fault management at PKS 
Supervision of the PKS network has been concentrated to one NCC, located in Joensuu, 
North Karelia. In a normal situation, the NCC is manned from 06:00 to 22:00. During 
the office hours (08:00-16:00), there are two operators on duty and in the evening 
(16:00-22:00) the supervision is handled by a single operator. During nighttime (22:00-
06:00), the operator on duty is on-call but is based at home. If control actions are re-
quired from the operator, they are handled with a laptop PC, using virtual private net-
work (VPN). The responsibility over the network is not shared (e.g. geographically) in a 
normal situation. Instead, both operators are responsible for the whole network. The 
personnel working in the NCC are not full-time operators and hence carry out operator 
duties along with their main responsibilities, typically doing a couple of NCC shifts per 
month. [79] 
In case of an LV-fault, the fault management process is initiated by an alarm from AMR 
device or by a task from the customer service, based on a disturbance call from the cus-
tomer. Typically a remote query is then sent to all AMR devices in the suspected faulted 
LV-network. This provides the operator with information on whether there is an actual 
fault in the LV-network or not. If necessary, the operator will contact the customer di-
rectly to ask for further information or to provide instructions. If an actual fault is de-
tected, the operator sends a work order to the responsible contractor via CaCe, who then 
dispatches a field crew to repair the fault. After repairing the fault, the field crew fills in 
the LV-fault report to CaCe with mobile PGField-device. The fault report then flows to 
DMS600 WS, where it is checked by the operator. [79] 
The MV-fault management process is normally initiated by MicroSCADA alarm, result-
ing from a circuit breaker trip. This also causes an audible alarm sound to be played. 
After this, the operator begins to analyze the situation, based on his/her expertise and 
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the information available from IT-systems. Normally DMS600 WS establishes the fault 
automatically based on the information received from MicroSCADA but sometimes the 
fault has to be created manually, if the fault is not rapidly established. This is necessary 
to get the customer notification working (e.g. the web outage map and SMS-messages), 
which is considered essential at PKS. The SMS messages are sent to customers who are 
experiencing an outage 5 minutes after the fault has been established in DMS600 WS 
and at the same time the fault is updated to the web outage map on PKS website. After 
the fault has been established in the system, the operator begins the isolation process. 
The fault location information is utilized if it is available, however this is rarely the 
case. The operator begins the isolation with RCDs, utilizing both bisection and zone by 
zone rolling methods. The control-dialogs for RCDs are opened straight from DMS600 
WS interface, which facilitates the isolation process. However, sometimes the dialog 
does not work correctly and instead the device has to be operated from MicroSCADA, 
which requires additional work. Although it is possible to control feeder circuit breakers 
through DMS600 WS, they are instead controlled from MicroSCADA. For this reason, 
the MicroSCADA process display interface is typically kept open continuously during 
the isolation process. After the remote isolation has been completed, the operator con-
tacts the field crew and guides it to the faulted area, where the field crew begins the 
manual isolation according to the operator’s instructions. The field crew then repairs the 
fault and restores supply for the rest of the customers. The field crew also provides the 
operator with further information regarding the fault, which is added to the fault report 
by the operator. An SMS-message is also sent to the restored customers, confirming that 
the fault has been repaired. [79] 
At PKS, a multiple fault situation is typically considered when there are around 5–10 
simultaneous MV-faults. This results in additional operators being called to duty. This 
is however affected by the starting interval of the faults. For example if 10 faults start 
within a few minutes, the 1–2 operators that are normally on duty are unable to effec-
tively manage them but if the starting interval is e.g. 15 minutes, the operators on duty 
can handle the situation without additional resources. When additional resources are 
called to work, the decision is made by the operator on duty, who has the best under-
standing of the ongoing situation and the trend. It is particularly difficult if a multiple 
fault situation occurs during nighttime, when the operator has to work with a single lap-
top PC and is unable to use multiple systems and interfaces simultaneously, since mul-
tiple display devices are not available. Due to this, additional resources have to be called 
in for a situation that could be handled by a single operator in the NCC. It is estimated 
that a single operator can handle even 10 faults in the NCC but probably less than half 
of that at home. Except for the possible additional resources, the actual fault manage-
ment process and the responsibilities still correspond to the single fault situation. [79] 
Formally a major power disruption has been defined as a situation where at least 25 
fault are encountered within a day. Again, the starting intervals of the faults greatly af-
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fect the severity of the situation. The decision to shift the organization into a major 
power disruption state is again made by the operator(s) on duty. However, typically the 
organizational readiness is increased gradually when the situation develops, utilizing 
e.g. weather forecasts in the evaluation. At PKS, a specific major power disruption or-
ganization has been created to increase the effectiveness of fault management in severe 
situations. The organization has predefined roles for the personnel to facilitate the or-
ganizational shift to a major power disruption state. Unlike in previous situations, the 
operator roles are divided into two categories; operators handling only remote isolations 
and operators guiding the field crews to handle manual isolations and repairs. There are 
currently 6 “fixed” workstations available for network operation and they are typically 
all used in a major power disruption. Additionally, it is also possible to use laptop PCs, 
however the fixed workstations are usually sufficient as there is a limited number of 
qualified operators available. A contractor’s representative is also invited to the NCC to 
manage the field resources. PKS mainly uses a single contractor and therefore only one 
representative is typically present. During a major power disruption, the progress of the 
fault management process differs from the previous situations. All remote isolations are 
carried out by a certain operator who then passes the fault on to another operator. This 
operator requests resources from the contractor’s representative, who gathers them for 
the operator to use. The operator then guides the field crews under his/her command to 
handle the manual isolations and repairs, using a group call system. All switching op-
erations must be approved by the NCC and since there is a limited number of operators 
available, it is typical that the field crews have to wait for permission to carry out the 
manual switchings. The fault state-functionality of DMS600 WS is utilized to monitor 
the fault states while they are being managed by multiple operators in different stages. 
The field group –field is also used to keep track of the field crews dispatched to a fault. 
The fault reporting of major power disruptions is typically done only after the situation 
is over. In some cases the reporting may be started a week after the actual event. The 
faults are also not necessarily reported by the personnel who handled them during the 
initial situation. Due to these reasons, the accuracy of the information in the fault re-
ports is often not as accurate as in e.g. single fault situation. [79] 
7.2.2 Development ideas and requirements 
In addition to the DSO-specific fault management description, development ideas and 
requirements were also gathered during the visits. The basic idea was to identify devel-
opment needs in each phase of the general fault management process, depicted in chap-
ter 4.3 and Figure 9. At PKS, most of the needs concerned fault isolation, field crew 
management and reporting. The gathered development ideas and requirements are dis-
cussed further below. 
At PKS, the Fault Service module is configured to create the fault package instantly 
after information of a circuit breaker trip has been received. This enables fast customer 
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notification but fault current data is ignored if it is unavailable once the fault package is 
created. This naturally results in lower percentage of faults being located. Therefore, the 
Fault Service module should be modified to allow data supplementation during fault 
management, after the initial fault package has been created. This would provide the 
operator with more information about possible fault locations and the feasibility of the 
current automatic fault isolation and restoration function would also be improved. To 
provide the operator with more information on possible fault locations, it would also be 
helpful if the fault locations transferred from other systems were automatically linked to 
corresponding faults in DMS600 WS. Currently, these fault locations appear as “find-
ings” and have to be looked up separately. [79] 
A need for a more feasible automatic fault isolation and restoration, utilizing automatic 
experimental switchings was identified. Automatic experimental switchings were not 
considered an electrical safety risk as the interviewees saw no significant difference in 
whether the switchings are carried out automatically by DMS or manually by an opera-
tor. Therefore there were no objections to utilizing e.g. automatic zone by zone rolling 
method in fault isolation. However, the operator should have a kill switch available to 
abort the automatic isolation if he/she considers it necessary. Also, a tool for prioritizing 
faults should be available in DMS600 WS. PKS currently utilizes a separate application 
for fault prioritization but the interviewees agreed that this kind of function should be 
available in DMS to reduce the need to use multiple different applications and interfaces 
during fault management. At least the KAH-value and standard compensations should 
be considered in the prioritization and a visual, map-based interface for the tool was 
seen feasible. In addition, line sections should also be visualizable, based on environ-
mental factors (e.g. highlighting of tree-safe/wooded line sections). The operator could 
utilize this information to infer the most probable fault locations.  [79] 
During the interview, it was pointed out that, especially during a major power disrup-
tion, DSOs often have multiple different types of field crews operating in the field. 
Some field crews are fully equipped for repair work while others may only handle man-
ual isolations without carrying any equipment. In addition, there are often lumberjacks 
and forestry machines involved in the fault management process. These crews should be 
classifiable to different categories and visualized with a different symbol on the map. 
This would allow the operator to dispatch each crew to the correct location by only us-
ing the geographic interface of DMS600 WS. The same function could also be used to 
track field crews doing regular line section clearing. At PKS, the “field crew”-form in 
the fault management interface is currently used to keep track of the field crew dis-
patched to a certain fault. This was not considered very practical, since it is necessary to 
type the name of the field crew manually for every fault. It should be possible to add a 
field crew from the field crew management interface to a certain fault in the fault man-
agement interface, eliminating the need to manually type field crew names. Currently 
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the fault management interface and the field crew management interface are not inte-
grated in any way. [79] 
As was explained in the previous chapter, fault reporting of major power disruptions is 
often initiated days after the actual event, which often results in less accurate infor-
mation and takes a considerable amount of time. According to the interview, an operator 
may have some free time in certain phases of fault management and this free time could 
be used to report ongoing faults to the greatest extent possible. This would improve the 
accuracy of the fault reports as the information is still fresh in the operator’s mind and 
the need to use paper notes would also be reduced. In addition, workload could be re-
duced if at least some of the additional information (e.g. interruption type and fault rea-
son) could be filled in automatically for a certain group of faults that are all related to 
the same major power disruption. However, information filled in manually by an opera-
tor may not be overwritten as there may be cases where the additional information is 
used in determining the refund liability of e.g. appliance damage. According to the in-
terviewees, there are also some cases where the outage areas automatically included in 
the fault report are incorrect. Therefore all outage areas have to be checked manually, 
which takes time. To speed up this process, a visual map-based presentation of all out-
age areas and their corresponding outage times (e.g. in different colors) was considered 
helpful. Additionally, automatic comparison of the AMR data and the outage times in 
the DMS database would help the operator in finding the incorrect fault reports. If the 
reports are not carefully reviewed, it is possible that, for example, an operator gets a 
double payment for a single fault as the transaction in HeadPower WMS is dependent 
on DMS acknowledgment. This is possible when all unsupplied customers are not cor-
rectly linked to a fault and the operator has to manually create a second fault for the 
same feeder to ensure customer notification for all unsupplied customers. If both of 
these faults are later acknowledged in DMS during fault reporting, the contractor will 
get payment for both, although the other one was not an actual fault. [79] 
As indicated previously, customer notification plays an important role at PKS, since it 
has been found to decrease unnecessary disturbance calls significantly. According to the 
interviewees, the Energy Authority has also recently shown growing interest in DSOs’ 
customer notification performance. Therefore a tool for monitoring the status of SMS 
notification is needed. Currently the web outage map is used to track the status of the 
SMS messages, as the Outage Info Sender handles both web and SMS notification and 
hence, if the outage shows up on the outage map, the SMS messages have also been 
sent. However a more practical tool for monitoring the state of SMS notification would 
be helpful. Finally, PKS has also had an issue when loading LV-networks in DMS600 
WS. According to the interviewees, it may sometimes take over a minute to load a sin-
gle LV-network. This problem is apparently caused by the current configuration, where 
the LV-networks are requested and loaded separately from the PG server. The problem 
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should be fixed when the successor of PG is deployed and the LV-networks are availa-
ble at the local server. [79] 
7.3 Savon Voima Verkko Oy 
Savon Voima Verkko Oy is one of the two subsidiaries of Savon Voima Oyj. The other 
subsidiary is Savon Voima Salkunhallinta Oy, which provides financial services in the 
energy sector. Together, they form the Savon Voima Group. Savon Voima Verkko Oy 
(later SVV) delivers electricity for over 117 000 households and businesses, mostly in 
the Northern Savonia region. [86], [87] The operating area of SVV is presented in Fig-
ure 21. 
 
Figure 21. The operating area of Savon Voima Verkko Oy. [87] 
The total length of SVV distribution network is almost 27 000 km. About 11 700 km of 
this is MV-network and the rest is LV-network. SVV also operates roughly 500 km of 
110 kV regional network. [87], [8] Like with PKS, the operating area is large and the 
Northern Savonia region is also highly forested and therefore the operational environ-
ment is very similar to that of PKS. [84] The cabling rate of 6.7 % in the MV-network is 
highest among the three interviewed DSOs. However, the network still mostly consists 
of overhead lines and is nonetheless prone to faults. [8] 
SVV operates 40 primary substations with over 300 feeders. There are about 1900 
RCDs, roughly 16 per 100 km of MV-network, which is the highest ratio among the 
interviewed DSOs. This amount is also increasing constantly, due to significant invest-
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ments in the network. A few dozen fault indicators have also been installed into the ca-
bled MV-network and their installations will continue in the future. Currently fault indi-
cators are also being considered for overhead distribution network, but no decision has 
yet been made. [8], [80] 
The main IT-systems integrated with DMS600 at SVV are MicroSCADA Pro SYS600 
(MicroSCADA) and Tieto PowerGrid NIS (PG). Therefore, from a system point of 
view, the environment is similar to that of PKS. In addition, SVV has co-developed a 
situational awareness system GridWise with Tieto that is also used to handle WMS 
functionalities. [88], [80] SVV operates its own WiMAX network as a primary field 
communication solution and in the future, LTE mobile networks are used as an auxilia-
ry solution. [89] 
7.3.1 Fault management at SVV 
Network supervision is handled from a concentrated NCC, located in Siilinjärvi, North-
ern Savonia. The NCC is normally manned during 6:45–22:15 and a single operator is 
responsible for the whole operating area in a normal situation. In the nighttime (22:15-
6:45), the operator on duty is based at home and any required control actions are per-
formed remotely with a laptop PC, using VPN connection. [80] 
The NCC operators take no part in the LV-fault management process if the fault is re-
ported by a customer via phone. In this case, a separate fault service team will handle 
the process. The fault service team personnel have no access to DMS and instead the 
AMR queries are performed from the MRS. The NCC is involved in LV-fault manage-
ment only if the fault is detected from an AMR alarm. In this case, the operator per-
forms the AMR queries to determine the origin of the fault and the extent of the situa-
tion. The operator may also be in contact with the customer and give further instruc-
tions. If a fault is determined, a work order is sent to the contractor via GridWise and a 
field crew is dispatched to repair the fault. The field crew is normally allowed to carry 
out the LV-switching operations independently but in difficult cases, instructions are 
given by the NCC. The field crew is responsible for reporting the fault via GridWise, 
from which it is transferred to DMS database. [80] 
MV-fault management process is initiated by a MicroSCADA alarm. Unlike at PKS, 
there is no configured time limit for the creation of the fault package at SVV and fault 
management is not initiated in DMS600 WS until fault current measurement data has 
been received. This results in more faults being located, since measurement data is not 
rejected but delays the opening of the fault management interface and customer notifica-
tion. The delays are also partly caused by the old SCIL-API interface that is still used. 
After the fault management interface has opened in DMS600 WS, SMS-messages are 
sent to unsupplied customers and the operator begins the isolation process, utilizing 
experimental switchings. Despite the configuration difference, the fault location is still 
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too rarely available and therefore no significant advantage is gained from the functional-
ity. In a normal situation, the operator sends a work order to the contractor after the fault 
has been isolated and a field crew is then dispatched to repair the fault. Hence, the pro-
cedure corresponds to that of an LV-fault. After the fault has been repaired, customers 
receive SMS-messages confirming the restoration of supply. The fault is then reported 
in DMS600 WS by the operator who handled the fault. [80] 
There is no formal definition or state of readiness for a multiple fault situation at SVV. 
According to the interviewees, a single operator can handle even 10–20 active faults 
without assistance. However, during office hours, it is easy to call another operator to 
assist in managing the faults, if deemed necessary. Outside office hours, assistance is 
usually not requested in a multiple fault situation unless absolutely necessary. The pro-
gress of the fault management process corresponds to the normal situation, with the ex-
ception that the operator has to start prioritizing the fault management actions. [80] 
A formal definition for a major power disruption at SVV is 10 faults per region within 
24 hours. The operating area of SVV consists of 4 regions and therefore a situation with 
40 faults in the whole operating area is considered a major power disruption. This initi-
ates the major power disruption organization. The aforementioned definition is, howev-
er, formal and it is possible that the major power disruption organization is used also in 
less severe situations. At SVV, the decision to shift the organization to a major power 
disruption state is made by the operations manager or, in his/her absence, the operations 
engineer on duty. In addition to the number of active faults, weather forecasts and the 
situation in the operating areas of neighboring DSOs are considered, when evaluating 
the need to shift the organization into the major power disruption state. There are 4 
workstations in the NCC but it is also possible to operate the network from other work-
stations. However, at best there are 10 qualified operators available in a major power 
disruption. In the field, there are often forestry machines and lumberjacks working to-
gether with the contractors’ field crews. In addition, there are also SVV’s own person-
nel who only carry out manual isolations and do not participate in the repair work. Like 
at PKS, the operators’ responsibilities change in a major power disruption. At SVV, 
there are three different types of operators. First, there are operators who only handle 
remote isolations and then pass the fault on for manual isolation. Then there are opera-
tors who only guide SVV’s own personnel to carry out the manual isolations. These 
operators give the permissions to operate the manual disconnectors but leave the faults 
unrepaired after they have been isolated manually. Finally, the fault is repaired under 
the command of the third operator who guides the contractors’ field crews to handle the 
repair work. In the NCC, there is also a person who leads the fault management and 
allocates the resources (field crews) for each fault. There may also be contractors’ rep-
resentatives present to handle the communication between the NCC and the local con-
tractor foremen. During a major power disruption, work orders are not sent via Grid-
Wise but are instead given via phone. At SVV, separate MS Excel and MS OneNote 
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documents are used to keep track of the field crews dispatched to faults. The operators 
are responsible for reporting the faults after the situation is over. This might be done 
days after the initial situation and results in similar difficulties as in the case of PKS. 
[80] 
7.3.2 Development ideas and requirements 
At SVV, most of the development requirements regarded fault isolation and field crew 
management. Especially tools for prioritization were considered necessary. A more fea-
sible automatic fault isolation and restoration was also seen important. Some of the re-
quirements and ideas were similar to those of PKS, however, differing opinions were 
also presented. The gathered development ideas and requirements are reviewed more 
thoroughly in the following paragraphs.  
As was explained earlier, there is no time limit set for the fault package creation and the 
fault management is not initiated until the fault current measurement data has been re-
ceived. This increases the amount of located faults but results in customer notification 
delays. The problem is similar to what was discussed previously at PKS, where the fault 
current data is rejected to speed up customer notification. At SVV, however, the config-
uration is different and instead the fault current data is received but customer notifica-
tion is delayed. In any case, the previously discussed fault data supplementation solu-
tion would also benefit SVV. [80] 
The interviewees at SVV did not consider automatic experimental switchings as an elec-
trical safety risk and automatic fault isolation and restoration was deemed necessary. 
However, several requirements for the implementation of automatic fault isolation and 
restoration were presented. According to the interviewees, the system should be able to 
manage multiple faults simultaneously and also handle situations where a new fault oc-
curs on a partly isolated feeder. Currently, DMS600 WS does not create a new fault if 
there is already an active fault in the same feeder. Therefore, e.g. the current automatic 
fault isolation and restoration function would not be able to manage such a situation. 
The system should also primarily utilize fault location information and only utilize ex-
perimental switching methods if fault location information is not available. In addition, 
at SVV, the fault indicators keep the indication information for about 10 minutes before 
resetting and therefore, in the case of a new fault on the same feeder, the fault indication 
may not be reliable. This should be taken into consideration when implementing a new 
fault isolation and restoration function. [80] 
Fault prioritization was considered highly important in all fault situations and in various 
phases of the fault management process. However, the prioritization tool should also 
present the critical areas as a prioritized list since a map-based visualization was consid-
ered possibly confusing in a major power disruption situation. The map view and the list 
should be integrated so that it is possible to locate an area from the map by using the 
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list. According to the interviewees, at least four factors should be considered in the pri-
oritization; the KAH-costs, standard compensations, critical customers and outage dura-
tion limits defined by the Electricity Market Act. The user should also be able to stress 
each factor at his/her own discretion and the level of visualization should be smoothly 
configurable. A feeder level visualization was considered more useful in a major power 
disruption but a disconnector zone based visualization could be used when there are 
only a few faults. In addition, if a new fault has a very high priority, even an audible 
alarm could be played to ensure that the operator immediately responds to the situation. 
[80] 
To facilitate SVV’s fault management process, where multiple operators participate in 
handling each fault, an effective function to monitor the states of the ongoing faults 
would be needed. Currently it is possible to manually update the fault state (e.g. isolated 
by remote control or isolated by work group) from the fault management interface and 
this function is also used to update the fault state displayed on the web outage map. 
However, it requires additional work from the operator and an automatic fault state 
identification and update would leave the operator more time to concentrate on handling 
the actual fault. In addition, the system could also notify the operator if e.g. the fault has 
not been completely isolated by remote control. A similar state monitoring function for 
the field crews was also considered helpful to know whether a field crew is vacant or 
has been dispatched to a work site. Again, the interviewees considered that an automatic 
update would reduce the additional work needed but also recognized that the infor-
mation would have to come from the field crew. This, however, would require addition-
al equipment and changes to the whole fault management process. In total, an integra-
tion between the field crew and fault management functions was considered necessary. 
For example, it should be possible to add a field crew from the field crew management 
interface to a fault in the fault management interface. The same requirement was also 
presented previously at PKS. In addition, an idea about sending a prioritized work order 
list to the field crews, was also thrown out. The list would contain the next work sites 
for the field crews, which would reduce the phone conversations with the NCC. How-
ever, no practical way to implement this was presented. [80]  
Unlike at PKS, fault reporting during fault management was not considered necessary. 
On the contrary, it was even considered a hindrance for effective fault management. 
According to the interviewees, the operator has no time for fault reporting during fault 
management in a major power disruption. The automatic reporting tool, however, was 
considered feasible but the information filled in manually should never be overwritten. 
Hence, these requirements corresponded to the ones presented previously at PKS. 
As was previously described, the fault state displayed on the web outage map is current-
ly updated manually from the fault management interface and the operator’s manual 
work could be reduced if this was done automatically by the system. An idea was also 
thrown out, regarding a functionality to choose the customers to whom the fault state is 
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updated. For example, certain LV-networks could be selected from the map to provide 
more accurate estimations of the repair durations and information about the ongoing 
repair work. Currently, at SVV, DMS600 WS should automatically set a default dura-
tion of 4 hours for all faults, but in some cases the duration has not been set and it has to 
be done manually. In addition, the default time should be configurable during fault 
management as new 4 hours are added if the fault has not been repaired during the first 
4 hours. According to the interviewees, customers become frustrated if the initial dura-
tions are not accurate and the duration is increased constantly. Therefore, the customers 
are often more willing to accept a longer, accurate estimation than initially shorter esti-
mations that are constantly prolonged. [80] 
Other requirements that came up during the interviews regarded the AMR-
functionalities and DMS notes. DMS notes should be categorizable into different clas-
ses and different types of notes should have a different symbol on the map. Among oth-
er things, DMS notes are used to denote fault locations and field crew locations and 
when there are dozens of notes having the same symbol, it becomes difficult to find the 
information needed in fault management. Therefore, it should be possible to link these 
notes to e.g. certain faults. Regarding LV-fault management, certain AMR alarms 
should be blockable to ensure that the more critical ones (e.g. zero sequence faults and 
conductor breaks) are detected. Currently all AMR alarms are equal in DMS600 WS, 
while in reality, for example alarms regarding wrong rotation direction or voltage devia-
tions are not critical during a major power disruption. In addition, function to complete-
ly block selected AMR devices should be added. According to the interviewees, SVV 
has multiple consumption points where the consumption is minimal or the main fuses 
have been disconnected. In these cases, the AMR alarms are irrelevant and the devices 
should be blocked. Overall, the interviewees considered that simplicity and user friend-
liness is highly important. This is especially the case in a major power disruption as 
there are people using DMS600 WS, who are less experienced in using the system. [80]  
7.4 Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy 
Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy is a subsidiary of Suur-Savon Sähkö Oy. Together with an-
other subsidiary, Kerienergia Oy, they form the Suur-Savon Sähkö group. The group is 
involved in energy procurement, production and delivery in the Eastern Finland. The 
parent company, Suur-Savon Sähkö Oy, owns most of the group’s assets, including the 
electricity distribution network and the district heat network. The electricity distribution 
network has been leased to Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy (later JSE), which provides elec-
tricity distribution services for over 102 000 customers. JSE operates mainly in the 
Southern Savonia region, but the operating area extends also partly to Northern Savo-
nia, Central Finland, Päijänne Tavastia, Kymenlaakso and South Karelia regions. [90] 
The operating area is presented below in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. The operating area of Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy. [90] 
The total length of JSE’s distribution network is about 27 000 km. Roughly 8000 km of 
the total network length is MV-network and 18 500 km is 0.4 kV LV-network. JSE has 
also developed a 1 kV distribution system, which acts as an extension to the MV-
network in rural areas but is still considered an LV-system by the SFS 6002 standard. 
[91], [69] In addition, JSE operates 430 km of 110 kV regional network. [81], [8] As 
was the case with the other DSOs, the operating area of JSE is also highly forested, with 
nearly 90 % of the land area being covered by forests in Southern Savonia. In addition, 
the network area is heavily divided by inland waters, which further complicates the fault 
management process. [84, p. 10] The cabling rate of JSE’s MV-network is also fairly 
low, about 5 %. [8] Overall, the low cabling rate in a highly forested area together with 
numerous island locations and inland waters generate a difficult environment. Of the 
interviewed DSOs, the environment of JSE is probably the most challenging one. 
JSE’s distribution network consists of some 260 feeders that are fed by 46 primary sub-
stations. Currently, there are about 800 RCDs installed in the network, which gives a 
rate of roughly 10 RCDs per 100 km of MV-network. The amount of RCDs is also in-
creasing strongly, as about 100 new secondary substations are installed annually and 
roughly half of them are fitted with at least one RCD. In addition, SCBs are also utilized 
to create separate protection zones for MV branches, which reduces outages in the main 
lines. SCBs also increase the net present value of the network considerably more than 
RCDs. There are currently no fault indicators installed in the network, although there 
has been some pilot projects in the past. At that time, the reliability of the devices was 
insufficient and hence they were not utilized further. However, re-deployment of fault 
indicators has been recently under consideration as the technology has evolved. No in-
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vestment decision have been made and JSE has currently no interest in pilot projects 
and is instead looking for a reliable and tested product. Therefore, even if an investment 
decision was made, it would take years before fault indicators could be widely utilized 
in fault management. [81] 
JSE uses Tieto PowerGrid NIS (PG) integrated with DMS600 but unlike the other inter-
viewed DSOs, the SCADA is a Netcon 3000, developed by Netcontrol. Therefore, from 
a system point of view, the environment is somewhat different from the other DSOs. 
The use of a different vendors’ SCADA also prevents the use of some DMS600 WS 
functionalities. Like at PKS, Tieto Care Center (CaCe) is used as a WMS. JSE operates 
its own radio communication network for field communication. According to the inter-
viewees, this becomes sometimes a bottleneck for putting new RCDs into service as 
establishing communication between the RTU and SCADA takes time if there is no 
radio network coverage in the area. [81] 
7.4.1 Fault management at JSE 
As was the case with the other interviewed DSOs, the network supervision is handled 
normally from a concentrated NCC, located in Mikkeli, Southern Savonia. However, 
there is a secondary location in Savonlinna, which is often used for managing faults in 
that area during a major power disruption. In total, there are 7 workstations available for 
network supervision, of which 6 are located in the primary NCC in Mikkeli and one in 
the secondary location in Savonlinna. In a normal situation, one operator handles the 
supervision tasks for the whole network. The NCC is manned from 06:00 to 22:00 and 
during nighttime, (22:00-06:00) the operator is based at home and controls are handled 
with a laptop PC, if necessary. [81] 
At JSE, disturbance calls regarding LV-faults are handled by an independent contractor, 
CallWaves Solutions Finland Oy (later CallWaves). They instructs customers to e.g. 
check their fuses and also gather further information regarding the situation. CallWaves 
has no access to DMS or MRS and therefore, if the situation is not solved with the sim-
ple instructions provided by the CallWaves representative, the fault is passed on to the 
NCC. The NCC operator then analyzes the situation by sending queries to the AMR 
devices of the affected LV-network. Real time queries are currently not supported by all 
AMR devices and therefore the operator occasionally has to rely on the information 
gathered by CallWaves. If necessary, the NCC may also contact the customer directly 
via phone. Some AMR devices also send spontaneous alarms but in each case the fault 
is confirmed by using a manual query, if possible. After an LV-network has been de-
termined faulty, a contractor’s field crew is dispatched to the location by sending a work 
order via CaCe. The field crew is responsible for reporting the fault after it has been 
repaired. Finally, the NCC checks the report and archives it accordingly. [81] 
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As usual, the MV-fault management process is initiated by a SCADA alarm that also 
causes the fault management interface to open after the fault package has been received. 
Due to incomplete fault service configuration, fault current information is currently not 
available from most of the primary substations and the fault location function cannot be 
utilized. After analyzing the situation, the operator begins the isolation process. The 
general practice at JSE is to first use the bisection method and then continue with the 
zone by zone rolling method. Depending on the operator, bisection method may be used 
multiple times before continuing with zone by zone rolling. This speeds up the process 
as there are typically numerous remote-controllable switching devices available and the 
early use of zone by zone rolling would be too slow. Since JSE uses Netcon 3000, the 
control dialogs cannot be opened directly from the geographical interface of DMS600 
WS and therefore a separate schematic view of the area has to be always open in Netcon 
3000. Upon receiving the fault package, a work order is also automatically sent to Ca-
Ce. The work order includes an estimation of the faulted area (e.g. feeder and some LV-
network in the faulted zone) so that the field crew knows approximately where they 
should be headed. In addition, the operator confirms the work order by calling the con-
tractor. As was the case with the other interviewed DSOs, JSE uses SMS messages and 
web outage map for customer notification and they are updated upon receiving the fault 
package. After the field crew has moved to the faulted area, the operator guides them in 
manual isolations. An operator’s permission to operate is required for all MV-switching 
operations. After the fault has been repaired, normal switching state is restored and the 
operator reports the fault in DMS600 WS. Information regarding the damages and cause 
of the fault is received via phone from the field crew. [81] 
JSE has multiple different states of readiness for its fault management organization. The 
yellow and orange states correspond to a multiple fault situation and the red state corre-
sponds to a major power disruption. The decision to shift the organization from one 
state to another is highly dependent on the weather forecasts. JSE uses a special weather 
forecast service, provided by the Finnish Meteorological Institute. The service has been 
designed for alerting DSOs about weather conditions that will likely cause damages in 
the distribution network. When considering the need to shift the organization to a higher 
state of readiness, e.g. estimated wind speeds, the duration of the storm and the extent of 
possible damages are taken into account. The decision to raise the readiness to yellow 
state requires a mutual decision by two operators on duty. In a yellow state, there are 
typically 2–3 operators handling the faults. However, it is also possible that 2–3 opera-
tors are present but the formal readiness has not been raised. It is worth noting that since 
2 operators are required to raise the state to yellow, at least a second operator has to be 
called to duty before the formal readiness can be raised. In an orange state, there are 
typically 3–4 operators and raising the state to orange requires a mutual decision by an 
operator on duty and the operations manager. The general fault management process 
remains the same in yellow and orange states, only the operating area is divided be-
tween the operators. If the situation get more severe, contractors’ representatives may be 
77 
called in to guide the field crews. In this case, the next assignment and location is given 
to the field crew by the contractor’s representative, instead of the operator. [81] 
A major power disruption is symbolized by the red state. Raising the readiness to the 
highest state requires a co-decision of an operator on duty, the operations manager and 
the chief executive officer. However, the initiative to raise the state always comes from 
the operations personnel, who typically have the best situational awareness. Like before, 
the decision is made according to the weather forecast and is not defined by any formal 
criteria (e.g. amount of faults per day, as was the case with PKS and SVV). Typically at 
least some preparations for the situation have been initiated before the state is formally 
raised. All seven workstations are typically manned during a major power disruption 
and therefore 6 operators are working in the primary NCC and the secondary location in 
Savonlinna is also utilized. The secondary location acts as an independent NCC in its 
nearby areas. The general fault management process is the same as in the other states 
and the main difference is that the fault handling area is smaller for an individual opera-
tor. However, the overall responsibility of fault management in a certain area still lies in 
the hands of a single operator and there are no different operator types, as was the case 
with PKS and SVV. According to the interviewees, this speeds up the process as the 
operator is always aware of the previous events in his/her area and there is no need to 
familiarize him/herself with the situation. This is also considered an important factor in 
ensuring electrical safety in the field. During a major power disruption, the field crews 
also always get their next assignment and location from the contractor’s representative, 
instead of the operator. In addition, JSE also has its own personnel in the field isolating 
the faults manually and they are always guided by the operators. Like at PKS, a group 
call system is used for communication between the NCC and the field crews. [81] 
Other major differences are that resource management and crisis communications 
groups are set up in a major power disruption situation. The resource management 
group consists of JSE personnel handling the allocation of resources (field crews) to 
each operator, according to their needs. The crisis communication group consists of JSE 
management personnel and outside representatives from e.g. the Finnish Defence Forc-
es, Rescue Department and municipalities. This facilitates two-way communication 
between the outside parties and the DSO. For example, municipalities can provide in-
formation regarding critical home care patients, which the DSO can use to prioritize its 
fault management actions accordingly. The external organizations in turn receive accu-
rate information regarding e.g. the estimated outage durations in certain areas. The crisis 
management group is also responsible for informing the media about the situation, 
which reduces the amount of unnecessary disturbance calls and allows the operations 
personnel to concentrate on the actual fault management activities. [81] 
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7.4.2 Development ideas and requirements 
As was the case with the other interviewed DSOs, development ideas and requirements 
were discussed also at JSE. The development needs were mostly related to fault isola-
tion and field crew management and no significant new requirements or ideas came up. 
However, the results of the discussion are reviewed in the following. 
The need for an automatic fault isolation and restoration has been identified at JSE. Ac-
cording to the interviewees, JSE needs a system with high feasibility that does not re-
quire any initial data (e.g. fault location data) to begin the isolation. To achieve this, 
automatic experimental switchings should be allowed. However, if fault location data is 
available, it should be utilized first to speed up the isolation process. Overall, the inter-
viewees considered that the system should imitate the actions of a human operator. The 
system should also be able to isolate multiple faults simultaneously but only in separate 
fault management areas. Therefore it would be necessary to define fault management 
areas where the system is allowed to operate. This would ensure that the automatic iso-
lation and restoration would not interfere the human operators operating in another area. 
In addition, the system should be able to disregard inoperable switching devices (e.g. if 
a communication link cannot be established) and continue the isolation process using 
the next available device. The interviewees considered that a tool with the aforemen-
tioned features would be especially helpful during the beginning phase of a major power 
disruption, when numerous faults occur simultaneously. Since JSE uses the Netcon 
3000, cooperation with Netcontrol would be necessary to implement the tool. An idea of 
utilizing the current FLIR-interface (Fault Location, Isolation and power Restoration) of 
Netcon 3000 in the implementation was also discussed. However, this feature has been 
co-developed with Trimble, specifically for Trimble DMS and therefore both technical 
and proprietary issues may present an obstacle to this. [81] 
A tool for fault prioritization was also considered highly necessary. The interviewees 
considered that at least KAH-costs and critical customers should be taken into account 
in the prioritization. The user should be allowed to stress each factor based on his/her 
judgement and therefore an index-based prioritization could be used. However, a direct 
presentation of monetary values was also considered clear and easy to understand. Ac-
cording to the interviewees, a map-based visual presentation would be especially helpful 
and unlike at SVV, a disconnector zone based visualization was not considered confus-
ing, even during a major power disruption. The interviewees at JSE found a visual 
presentation more beneficial in multiple ways, comparing to the presented list-based 
view. According to them, a visual presentation will help the operators to develop a 
stronger intuition about the most important locations and line sections. This will eventu-
ally reduce the need to constantly use the prioritization tool. The map-based presenta-
tion was also considered helpful for the network planning department in determining the 
optimal locations for remote-controllable switching devices. Even field crews might 
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benefit from a map-based visualization as they would then have better understanding of 
where the field resources are being allocated and why. [81] 
Unlike with MicroSCADA, it is not possible to open the control dialogs of the switch-
ing devices directly from the geographical interface of DMS600 WS when using Netcon 
3000. Adding this feature also for Netcon 3000 would reduce the need to have multiple 
SCADA-windows open during fault management. Although not actually related to fault 
management, a need to visualize the ongoing maintenance outages on the DMS600 WS 
geographical interface was also presented. Due to the increasing amount of live-line 
working, it is necessary to ensure that the operator does not make potentially hazardous 
switching operations that affect the feeder with the ongoing live-line work. A potential 
work hazard could be caused by e.g. connecting the live-line work location with a feed-
er having reclosings on. Additionally the system could also automatically warn the op-
erator when he/she is about to make a potentially hazardous switching but this would 
require changes mostly to Netcon 3000. Alternatively, the previously described idea 
about categorizable DMS notes was also considered feasible for marking the ongoing 
maintenance outages on the map if different symbols for different types of notes were 
implemented. However, this would require manual work from the operator. In addition, 
an idea about a tool for simulating the damages and costs caused by a major power dis-
ruption was also presented. According to the interviewees, JSE has statistical data of 
e.g. the damages caused by a storm with certain wind speed and this data could be used 
by the tool to calculate the damages and e.g. KAH-costs in advance, based on the inputs 
provided by the user. The idea about this tool, however, was rather vague and the actual 
implementation had not been considered more thoroughly. [81] 
7.5 Summary of the gathered development ideas and re-
quirements 
During the interviews, numerous ideas and requirements were presented, some of which 
were significantly more complex than others. Hence, also significantly more work 
would be required to implement some of the proposed changes. Of the proposed chang-
es, the more complex ones were the new automatic fault isolation and restoration tool, 
the fault prioritization tool and the automatic fault reporting tool. The other ideas were 
mostly smaller additions and changes to some of the current features of the system. Ta-
ble 12 presents the gathered development ideas and requirements and also visualizes the 
ones that were considered necessary by multiple DSOs. From this table, it is easy to see 
which functionalities would provide value for multiple DSOs, according to the insights 
of the interviewed representatives. The last item in the table is in brackets, because it is 
not actually related to fault management, which was the topic of this thesis. 
 
80 
Table 12. Summary of the gathered development ideas and requirements. 
 PKS SVV JSE 
Fault data supplementation after a fault has 
been created in DMS600 WS ✓ ✓  
Changes to visualization of imported fault 
locations ✓   
New automatic fault isolation and restora-
tion tool ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Fault prioritization tool ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Field crew categorization & visualization 
with different symbols ✓ ✓  
Integrating field crew management with 
fault management ✓ ✓  
Automatic/semi-automatic reporting ✓ ✓ 
 
Features to enhance fault report checking ✓ 
  
Improvements to customer notification 
management ✓ ✓  
DMS notes categorization & visualization 
with different symbols  
✓ ✓ 
Changes to AMR-device and alarm man-
agement  
✓ 
 
Ability to open Netcon 3000 control dialogs 
from DMS600 WS   
✓ 
Major power disruption simulation tool 
  
✓ 
(Map visualization of maintenance outages) 
  
✓ 
 
The new automatic fault isolation and restoration tool and the fault prioritization tool 
were considered necessary by all three DSOs, as can be seen from Table 12. Other 
changes and improvements that were mentioned by multiple DSOs were the fault data 
supplementation, field crew and DMS notes categorization and the ability to visualize 
them with different symbols and the automatic or semi-automatic fault reporting. Inte-
grating the current fault management and field crew management functions were also 
mentioned in multiple interviews, along with some improvements to managing custom-
er notification features. Overall, the requirements and needs of PKS and SVV were sim-
ilar and the ones mentioned by JSE representatives seemed to differ from the two oth-
ers. One reason for this is that both PKS and SVV have mostly the same IT-systems in 
use while JSE uses, for example, a different SCADA. Naturally also the DSO represent-
atives present in the interviews have a significant effect on the results. Based on the 
results of the interviews, some ideas were chosen for more thorough review and they are 
described further in chapter 8. 
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8. IMPROVEMENTS TO FAULT MANAGEMENT 
IN DMS600 
As a result of the interviews presented in the previous chapter, numerous development 
ideas were obtained. After reviewing the results and the workload required, two larger 
changes were chosen to be more potent for implementation and were therefore chosen 
for implementation analysis: 
• A new fault prioritization tool 
• Automatic fault reporting feature 
These new functionalities will be reviewed thoroughly in chapters 8.1.1 and 8.1.2. Dur-
ing this thesis, a separate specification document was also created for the aforemen-
tioned new features, including e.g. the principles of operation and user interface models. 
Some of the other important requirements that came up during the interviews will also 
be reviewed in the latter part of this chapter, but the main focus is on the new function-
alities which will be implemented based on the specifications created in this thesis. 
However, before the implementation of any of the described features may begin, the 
customers’ willingness to pay for them must be confirmed. 
8.1 The most potent features for implementation 
A tool for fault prioritization was considered helpful and necessary by all interviewed 
DSOs and therefore it was a clear choice for a closer analysis. The tool could also be 
implemented by only making changes to DMS600 and no changes to e.g. MicroSCADA 
were needed. Therefore the tool could be implemented as an independent project, which 
was another reason why it was chosen for more thorough review and development. The 
fault prioritization tool is introduced further in chapter 8.1.1.  
The other new feature, chosen for a closer review is the automatic fault reporting fea-
ture. While automated fault reporting was not directly mentioned by the representatives 
during the interviews, it was clearly pointed out that fault reporting requires a lot of 
work after major power disruptions and some tool for reducing the workload is neces-
sary. Hence, an automated fault reporting feature was seen as a suitable solution to the 
problem. However, during this thesis it was somewhat unclear how completely the au-
tomation would be implemented as complete automation of fault reporting would re-
quire significant amount of work. Therefore both the completely automated fault report-
ing feature and a limited version will be discussed in chapter 8.1.2. 
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8.1.1 The fault prioritization tool 
The fault prioritization tool was discussed with all DSO representatives and they all 
agreed that it would be a useful addition in assisting the operator. During the interviews, 
several requirements regarding the functionality and usability of the tool were men-
tioned. Some representatives mentioned only one or two factors that should be taken 
into account in the prioritization while others named multiple ones. There was also 
some disagreement about whether the prioritization should be implemented as a visual, 
map-based view or as a prioritized list. In addition, different requirements for the priori-
tization level (e.g. feeder/disconnector zone) were presented. To best answer the needs 
of all DSOs, both map- and list-based interfaces were chosen for the suggested imple-
mentation in this thesis and also multiple factors will be available when generating the 
prioritization order but the user will be able to configure their weight in the prioritiza-
tion. User will also be able to change the level of prioritization according to each situa-
tion. The functionality of the tool will be discussed in greater detail below. 
During the customer interviews, four different factors were mentioned when discussing 
what should be taken into account when prioritizing faults. These were all chosen to be 
included in the prioritization tool and they are: 
• KAH-costs 
• Standard compensations 
• Critical customers 
• The maximum outage durations defined by the Electricity Market Act 
Since some of these factors are monetary (KAH-costs and standard compensations) and 
the others are non-monetary, they cannot be simply summed up. Therefore, a specific 
prioritization index is needed to represent the priority of each unsupplied area according 
to the chosen prioritization level. This index is generated by summing up four subin-
dexes representing each factor and weighting them with user-defined coefficients. The 
subindexes represent the relative importance of each factor in each unsupplied zone in 
the ongoing fault situation. In other words, the index is used to define the importance of 
each unsupplied zone in the current situation and not the absolute importance. 
To calculate the indexes, some simplifications had to be made since, e.g. the actual 
standard compensations cannot be calculated in the DMS as the information regarding 
the annual network service fees of the customers is not available in DMS. Also, since 
the DSO’s objective is to minimize e.g. the KAH-costs and the standard compensations, 
the growth rate of these factors is often more interesting to the DSO than the accumulat-
ed values that have already incurred and can no longer be affected by operator actions. 
Therefore, the tool primarily simulates the growth rate of these factors, although for the 
KAH-factor, the user can also configure the tool to use the accumulated KAH-value. 
The factor for taking the requirements of the Electricity Market Act into account will be 
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generated by using the Distribution Reliability Requirement Classes (DRRC) imple-
mented in the Master’s thesis of Lamminmäki [24]. This classification is a DMS600-
specific feature that is used to categorize consumption sites according to the require-
ments of the Electricity Market Act. The DRRC-factor of the prioritization tool will 
take into account the duration of the outage relative to the corresponding DRRC-limit 
and the amount of customers in each DRRC-category. Finally, the factor for critical 
customers will be generated by comparing the unsupplied critical customers of each 
zone to the total amount of unsupplied critical customers. The critical customers are 
defined by the importance rating available in DMS600. Importance ratings can be set 
either for specific customer nodes or whole secondary substations. By default, DMS600 
offers 10 importance classes that the DSO may utilize and name according to their 
needs. Due to this, the fault prioritization tool does not take into account the relative 
importances of customers having different importance ratings. For example a certain 
DSO could use rating 10 for hospitals and health centers while another might use rating 
5. Since the ratings are DSO-specific, the absolute importance cannot be determined 
directly from the rating. Due to this, all customers having an importance rating other 
than the default (1), will be considered as critical in the prioritization. If DSOs would 
generally use the same ratings for similar customers, the prioritization could be extend-
ed to take into account the difference in the importance ratings of customers/secondary 
substations.  
As previously mentioned, a requirement to change the prioritization level was presented 
by multiple DSO representatives. Therefore three different prioritization levels were 
chosen for implementation: 
• Feeder 
• Remote-controlled zone 
• Manual disconnector zone 
The user will be able to change the prioritization level quickly from a GUI window of 
the tool. This facilitates the use of the tool in different situations. For example during 
the first hours of a major power disruption, extensive parts of the network are typically 
unsupplied and therefore prioritization on a manual disconnector zone level will most 
likely be somewhat confusing. Instead, the user will likely want to see the prioritization 
on a feeder or remote-controlled zone level. However, during the last phases of a major 
power disruption or in a few fault situation, prioritization on a manual disconnector lev-
el can be useful when the unsupplied area is more limited. 
The selected prioritization will be presented on the map as well as a list. The values of 
the calculated prioritization indexes, used as a basis for the prioritization, will not be 
visible to the user. Due to its previously described nature, the specific value of the index 
in a certain zone are not interesting but their relation to the corresponding indexes of 
other unsupplied zones is. Therefore the list view will only display a list of zones in a 
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prioritized order according to the chosen level. In the map-based view, the unsupplied 
network will be colored based on the calculated indexes, similarly to the topological 
coloring. However, a highlight coloring will be used instead of a separate coloring mode 
and only the unsupplied areas will be highlighted. Using the highlight coloring, the cur-
rent switching state can be displayed in the background while utilizing the prioritization 
tool. Due to the nature of the prioritization index, the coloring will be dynamic, based 
on fractiles of the highest index in a current situation. Therefore the zone with the high-
est index will always be displayed in red and the coloring of the other zones will be de-
termined based on fractiles of the highest index. Therefore the coloring can only be used 
to determine the most important zones in the current situation as at least one area will 
always be colored in red but the color does not reflect the absolute criticality of that 
area. 
Since the prioritization is dynamic and the absolute criticality of the situation cannot be 
determined, additional information of the overall situation will be displayed in the out-
age information window. This information will include easy-to-understand key figures 
of the overall situation that the operator can use to assess the criticality of the situation 
and then use the prioritization tool to determine the critical zones in each situation and 
allocate resources accordingly. The key figures can be e.g. total amount of unsupplied 
customers, total amount of disconnected power and hourly KAH-growth rate in the 
network. A concept of the possible implementation is presented in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Concept of the interfaces of the new prioritization tool. 
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The main interfaces needed to use the tool are presented in the concept above. In the 
network window, the highlight coloring is visible with the topological coloring mode in 
the background and the list-based view can be seen on the right. The configuration in-
terface is also displayed in the figure, along with the modified outage information win-
dow with three key figures of the overall situation visible. 
As an external part of the prioritization tool, an additional KAH-coloring mode should 
also be added. This mode will color the whole network based on the hourly KAH-
growth rate of each feeder in the current topological situation. Monetary values will be 
used in this mode and the coloring limits will be defined by the user as with all other 
coloring modes. 
8.1.2 Automatic fault reporting 
Two of the three interviewed DSOs mentioned that fault reporting requires a lot of 
work, especially after major power disruptions. A number of options to reduce this 
workload were discussed during the interviews and later when analyzing the results of 
the interviews at ABB. Both limited and completely automatic fault reporting features 
were proposed for implementation. However, during further discussions, it was con-
cluded that implementing a completely automated fault reporting would require major 
changes to DMS600 WS and therefore the DSOs willingness to pay for such a feature 
must be discussed further with their representatives. During this thesis, it remained un-
clear which of the two options would eventually be implemented and therefore both 
options are briefly described in this chapter. 
In the completely automated reporting feature, the user will be able to choose multiple 
repaired but unreported faults from the fault list and report them all at once. This will 
initiate the simulation mode and DMS600 WS will simulate all the switchings regarding 
the selected faults. Currently the user has to simulate each fault separately and therefore 
DMS600 WS constantly switches between state monitoring and simulation states, which 
slows down the process. The user is also required to intervene by updating and accept-
ing the report for each fault. In the proposed feature, the outage areas will be created 
automatically for all the selected faults and also the outage durations and other infor-
mation will be calculated and added to the reports during the process without any in-
volvement required from the user. No significant changes to interfaces are required to 
implement this feature as the user is only required to select the faults he/she wishes to 
report and DMS600 WS then handles the process independently. 
As was described previously in chapter 5.2.5, most of the information needed to be 
filled in manually is contained in the “additional data” tab. While some DSOs may not 
use all the fields in the tab, at least the “Outage reason”, “Fault reason” and “Location 
of fault” –fields are required by the Finnish Energy. These fields have predefined codes 
and values according to the outage statistic instructions provided by Finnish Energy 
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[92] and they are used to compile the annual outage statistics. However, most of the 
faults occurred during the same major power disruption have same Outage reason (e.g. 
V1 Unanticipated interruption in own network) and Fault reason (e.g. L1 Wind and 
Storm). Also the value for the “location of fault” field is most likely “A2 Overhead line 
network” for majority of the MV-faults. Hence, to reduce the amount of manual work 
needed, the values for these fields could be copied to all faults occurred during the same 
major power disruption. A concept of a modified “additional data” tab is presented in 
Figure 24. In the figure, the fields that contain information that could be replicated to all 
faults occurred during the same major power disruption are circled in red. In the con-
cept, checkboxes have also been added to allow the user to choose what information 
will be replicated to the selected faults. 
 
Figure 24. Concept of a modified “additional data” tab, with the replicable fields cir-
cled in red. 
With the implementation of these features, the user would only fill in one “additional 
data” tab and select the faults for reporting and replication and no further involvement is 
required. Only the exact fault location would have to be added manually to each fault 
but this is often done as soon as the actual fault has been found and the fault is still ac-
tive in DMS. Naturally there are some cases where the replicated information is not 
accurate and has to be filled in manually and hence, if information has been filled in 
manually, it may not be overwritten by the replication feature. In the limited version of 
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the automated fault reporting, only the replication feature is included as it requires sig-
nificantly less work to implement. 
 
8.2 Future developments 
In addition to the ideas and requirements that were chosen for a closer review, multiple 
other viable improvements were discovered during the interviews. The most potential 
ones for future implementation will be reviewed in this chapter and their features will be 
described. The descriptions are mostly based on the requirements gathered during the 
interviews but also some additional ideas will be introduced for consideration and the 
results of the simulations carried out are reflected in the descriptions. 
The most important fault management improvement that was not included in the afore-
mentioned separate specification document is the new automatic fault isolation and res-
toration. As this feature is a larger upgrade, it will be reviewed separately in chapter 
8.2.1. The main difference when comparing this review to the new features described in 
chapter 8.1 is that no implementation specifications were generated that would e.g. con-
sider exact operation principles, usability and user interface design. Other viable but 
smaller changes and additions based on the interviews will be reviewed in chapter 8.2.2. 
8.2.1 New automatic fault isolation and restoration 
The current automatic fault isolation and restoration feature of DMS600 WS is not ac-
tively used by any of the current DMS600 customers and in order to facilitate its wider 
use, it is clear that it must be redesigned. This was also agreed by all the representatives 
of the interviewed DSOs. All the representatives also identified the need for automatic 
fault isolation and restoration and this was one of the two larger improvements men-
tioned in all interviews. However, the requirements gathered during the interviews were 
not comprehensive enough to create a specification for immediate implementation. Be-
fore beginning the implementation of such a large upgrade, further discussions, proba-
bly with more than three DMS600 customers, were deemed necessary and this was not 
possible within the timeline of this thesis. Also, implementation of this feature would 
not only require changes to DMS600 but also to the SCADA that it is integrated with. 
Naturally the feature would first be developed for DMS600–MicroSCADA –
combinations but the feature was also seen necessary by e.g. JSE and in this case co-
development with Netcontrol would be needed. The same applies for all DMS600–
external SCADA –combinations. Due to these reasons, the feature was not studied as 
thoroughly as the previously mentioned ones and no comprehensive specification was 
created during this thesis. However, some requirements and ideas regarding a new au-
tomatic fault isolation and restoration feature are discussed in this chapter. 
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During the interviews, all representatives agreed that the logic of a new automatic fault 
isolation and restoration should be based on utilizing experimental switchings. This 
conclusion is also supported by the simulations carried out; the automatic fault isolation 
and restoration must not be fully dependent on the fault location function as definite 
fault locations are rarely available and even then there were notable amount of incorrect 
locations included in the results. Also, based on the simulation results, changing the 
logic to restore some of the “likely healthy” –zones would not considerably improve the 
feasibility of the feature. In addition, according to the interviews, some DSOs have no 
interest in deploying fault indicators and even while others do, it will take years before 
reliable and extensive fault indication is available throughout the networks. Thus, to 
maximize the feasibility of the new feature for all customers, it must be implemented in 
a way that no initial data is necessarily required to commence the isolation sequence. 
However, if fault location information is available, it should be utilized as a primary 
option and in this case, the switching sequence would be planned as it is done currently. 
Unlike in the current system, the isolation should not be aborted by a circuit breaker trip 
and instead, the process must be continued by utilizing experimental switchings, like a 
human operator would do. Incomplete fault location information should also be utilized, 
e.g. if a fault is not definitely located due to multiple calculated fault locations in the 
end part of the faulted feeder. In this case, the system should try to restore the beginning 
and middle parts of the feeder without first applying experimental switchings to them 
and then continue with the experimental switchings in the end part of the feeder. A very 
general depiction of the logic is presented in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. Example of the new automatic fault isolation and restoration logic. 
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Also, if fault location is available and the planned switching sequence is interrupted by 
a circuit breaker trip, the system should remember what switching operation caused the 
trip and use this information when continuing the process with the experimental switch-
ings. When using experimental switchings, both bisection and zone by zone rolling 
methods should be utilized as this speeds up the isolation process, especially when the 
amount of remote-controllable devices increases constantly. 
One of the most important changes when comparing the new automatic fault isolation 
and restoration to the current one is that it should be able to isolate multiple faults sim-
ultaneously. Currently this is not possible and it limits the feasibility of the feature sig-
nificantly, especially in major power disruptions, when the need for the automation is 
greatest. However, it should be ensured that the multiple simultaneous isolation pro-
cesses do not interfere with each other. This could be accomplished by defining smaller 
operating areas where only one automatic isolation process is allowed at a time. 
To maximize the feasibility of the automatic fault isolation and restoration, the system 
should also be able to isolate a new fault on a feeder already having a partly isolated 
fault active. This requires changes to the general fault management logic, where only 
one fault may exist per feeder and therefore a new fault is not created in DMS when a 
circuit breaker trips on an already faulted feeder. Thus, the system should monitor the 
already isolated faults/feeders and commence a new isolation process if the feeding cir-
cuit breaker is tripped by a new permanent fault. This, however, includes a potential 
electrical safety risk, if e.g. a field crew is performing manual isolations or repair work 
in the previously isolated section. To overcome this issue, e.g. the fault state infor-
mation could be used. For example, if the fault state is “manual isolation in progress” or 
“repair in progress”, the system could ask confirmation from the operator before com-
mencing the new isolation sequence. In this case, however, the operators would have to 
be very careful when changing the fault states as the fault state is now mainly used to 
update the fault state on the web outage map. Alternatively, a confirmation could al-
ways be required when the system is about to commence a new isolation sequence on a 
feeder having an active fault. Another problem that may occur is that the fault indicator 
data may be false if the new fault appears shortly after the previous one. In this case, the 
fault indicator data may correspond to the previous situation as the devices may hold the 
previous state for e.g. 10 minutes before resetting. This, however, would not be a seri-
ous problem as the system would be able to continue the process with experimental 
switchings and only the planned sequence for the false location would fail. 
When implementing an automatic fault isolation and restoration feature with experi-
mental switchings allowed, certain safety-related issues have to be considered. To en-
sure electrical safety in all situations, the system should at least include the following 
features: 
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• Option to choose the areas or feeders where the automatic fault isolation and res-
toration is allowed to operate. 
• Automatic checking and reservation of the switching devices included in the au-
tomatic isolation process. 
• Option to abort the process manually from a separate kill switch. 
These features should prevent situations where e.g. operator tries to operate a switching 
device that is also being used by the automatic fault isolation and restoration. The abil-
ity to choose the operational areas would reduce the chances of interference with opera-
tor’s isolations. The system should also check that the switching devices it is about to 
use are available. However, a communication problem with a single device should not 
result in abortion of the process and instead, the next available device should be used. 
The kill switch will ensure that the operator has the ability to abort the process immedi-
ately if he/she sees it necessary. 
8.2.2 Other minor changes and additions 
In addition to the larger improvements described earlier, there are numerous smaller 
fault management–related changes and additions that could be implemented. Comparing 
to the larger improvements, these would require considerably smaller amount of work to 
implement. However, not all are worthwhile and therefore only a few of the most viable 
ones are discussed in this chapter and they are: 
• Fault data supplementation after a fault has been created in DMS600 WS 
• Better integration of fault management and field crew management 
• Field crew categorization and visualization with different symbols 
• DMS notes categorization and visualization with different symbols 
Currently no fault data is added to a fault in DMS600 WS after it has been established. 
Therefore the system can either be configured to wait until all information has been re-
ceived, which slows down customer notification or the fault can be created quickly but 
e.g. fault current measurement data could be missing. Allowing later supplementation of 
the fault data would ensure both fast customer notification and more complete fault da-
ta, which in turn enhances the feasibility of the fault location function.  
To allow for a more effective field crew management, integration with the fault man-
agement interface is necessary. Currently the fault management only supports a manual 
text field where the name of the field crew is typed for every fault and the field crews in 
the field crew management interface are completely separate feature. Instead of the 
manual text field, the field crew management should be opened from the “Field Group”-
button in the fault management interface and e.g. drag and drop could be used to attach 
field crews to a fault from the list. In addition, the field crew management interface 
could display the field crews as e.g. “busy” or “free” based on whether they have been 
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attached to a fault or not. This would remove the need to use external tools to keep track 
of the available field crews and their assignments. According to the interviews, separate 
MS Excel and MS OneNote documents currently have to be used for this purpose. 
As another addition to field crew management, the field crews should be categorizable 
according to e.g. their capabilities and equipment. There are already some fields in the 
field crew management interface that could be used for this categorization, such as the 
type of the vehicle the crew is using. Especially important is to be able to distinguish 
e.g. lumberjack and forestry machine crews from the actual repair crews. Therefore the 
different field crew classes should be visualized with different symbols and possibly 
even filtered to display only the selected classes on the map. 
A similar change is needed for the DMS notes that are used to mark a variety of infor-
mation on the map. Currently there is no way to tell whether a DMS note concerns e.g. 
contact information for a customer’s representative or a possible fault location without 
reading the note. In total, there may be hundreds, even thousands of notes that are dis-
played on the map, if selected. During fault management, only minority of these are 
relevant and therefore a categorization feature is needed. This feature would allow the 
user to define a certain amount of classes and name them at his/her own discretion. 
These would then be depicted by different symbols on the map and filtering would also 
be available to display only the selected class of notes. The feature would likely also 
prove helpful for other purposes, not only fault management. For example PKS uses the 
notes to mark locations in need of maintenance and consumption sites with microgener-
ation, among other things. Visualizing only these notes would be helpful for e.g. switch-
ing planning and maintenance planning personnel. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
Fault management has traditionally been a key part of the network operation process 
and despite the significant ongoing investments in distribution networks, it will remain 
so for at least the next decade. However, DSOs requirements and preferences regarding 
fault management have changed over time. For example the role of customer notifica-
tion has become increasingly important in the recent years as both the Energy Authority 
and decreasing public tolerance toward power outages has put pressure on the DSOs to 
provide more accurate customer notification services during outages. Also, the increas-
ing amount of network automation available enables better overall control of the net-
work and more data is also remotely available to be utilized in the fault management. 
The DMS is a key part of distribution automation as it combines and processes the in-
formation supplied by multiple sources. During fault situations, the DMS should be 
optimized to provide the operator with the best possible support in decision-making and 
therefore the fault management functionalities should comply with the needs of DSOs. 
This thesis studied the requirements of Finnish DSOs, regarding fault management in 
ABB MicroSCADA Pro DMS600 WS by interviewing three largest rural DMS600 cus-
tomers. Fault simulations were also carried out during the thesis to study the feasibility 
of the current fault management features of DMS600 WS. Based on the interviews and 
the results of the simulations, numerous development issues were identified and specifi-
cations for the implementation of the most important ones were also created. 
The fault simulations focused on the current automatic fault isolation and restoration 
feature available in DMS600 version 4.4 FP1 HF3. The feasibility of the fault location 
function was studied and the current isolation and restoration function was tested in an 
actual environment of a rural DSO. In addition, the monetary benefits achievable from 
the use of an automatic fault isolation and restoration were evaluated on a general level. 
According to the simulations, the switching sequences generated by the current auto-
matic fault isolation and restoration are mostly correct and multiple simultaneous faults 
in the same area do not affect its operation. However, the feature is not utilizable in 
most cases as it is fully dependent on the availability of the calculated fault location. 
According to the simulations, fault locations were calculated for less than 14 % of the 
2016 faults in the studied network and less than half of these were further definitely and 
correctly located. The average monetary benefits in terms of KAH-value reduction from 
the use of automatic fault isolation and restoration were also evaluated in this thesis. 
Although it proved difficult to provide reliable and accurate estimations, it seemed clear 
that the current feature provides very little benefits if e.g. extensive fault indication is 
not available, since the feature cannot be utilized in most cases. However, by changing 
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the logic of the feature, considerable benefits might be available, especially for the 
DSOs not having 24/7 manned NCC. For example, the average KAH-values for a fault 
in 2016, calculated with the actual disconnected power, were about 5000 € for DSO 1 
and 8000 € for DSO 2. Thus, according to the calculations, roughly 6–8 % KAH-
reduction could be achievable in the nighttime, if the NCC is not manned and on aver-
age 2–3 % reduction for all faults. Hence, if the automatic fault isolation and restoration 
could be used for most of the faults, the annual KAH-reduction could be hundreds of 
thousands of euros for a large, rural DSO as their annual KAH may often exceed 10 
million euros. 
Although the percentage of located faults gives some idea of the feasibility of the cur-
rent fault location function, the result is strongly affected by the configuration of the 
fault service module at the studied DSO. Since most relays are capable of transmitting 
and measuring the fault current or impedance of short-circuit faults, at least most of the 
short-circuit faults should be locatable. However it is the configuration of the DMS600 
and its components that may limit their availability in the system and this reduces the 
percentage of located faults. To study the overall feasibility of the function, it would 
have been better to choose an environment where the configuration allows all fault data 
to be processed in the DMS. Also, the manually created “customer notification faults” 
reduced the percentage in this study, but no simple way to filter them from the results 
was found. The calculated benefits per fault were most likely at least somewhat under-
estimated in this study as it was assumed that the power consumption is distributed 
evenly along the feeder. In reality the consumption is usually concentrated on the be-
ginning of the feeder and this area is also often less prone to faults and can therefore be 
often restored. It is also difficult to calculate the average KAH-reduction for a fault as 
the amount most likely differs significantly in different fault situations and overall, there 
are numerous factors that affect the calculations as many assumptions had to be made. 
However, the simulations were not the main focus of this thesis and therefore simplifi-
cations had to be made to keep the topic compact in this thesis. Overall, it seems that 
thorough analysis of the benefits of an automatic fault isolation and restoration could 
solely provide a topic for another thesis. 
The customer interviews provided numerous development issues, most notably re-
quirements for the new automatic fault isolation and restoration feature and the fault 
prioritization feature. The general fault management processes of the interviewed cus-
tomers were also described in this thesis. Although the interviewed DSOs were the three 
largest DMS600 customers, their requirements and preferences cannot be fully general-
ized to apply for all Finnish DSOs. The operating areas of the interviewed DSOs were 
also very similar and were located in the Eastern Finland and therefore a couple of 
DSOs operating in other parts of the country could have presented at least somewhat 
different opinions. In addition, the people participating in the interviews always have a 
strong effect on the results as there are certainly different perspectives inside each com-
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pany. Also, the order of the interviews most likely had some effect on the results as the 
DSOs that were interviewed later were presented with some requirements and ideas 
originally introduced in the previous interviews. Some DSO representatives also seemed 
better prepared for the interviews than others. However, it was beneficial that at least 
one person with solid experience in using DMS600 was present in all interviews. Final-
ly, during the interviews, the conversation sometimes tended to focus too much on the 
DSOs own processes and not on identifying the key development issues in the system, 
which was the main target of the interviews. Therefore, polite but strict guidance of the 
discussion could have been beneficial in some situations. 
Based on the results of the interviews and simulations, two features were chosen for 
implementation analysis; a new fault prioritization tool and an automatic fault reporting 
feature. Specifications for these two upgrades were created during this thesis and also 
visual concepts of the new user interfaces were presented. However, the implementation 
of these features had not begun during this thesis and therefore the presented concepts 
only represent the author’s view of the upcoming features. Still, the functionalities 
should mostly apply with the descriptions introduced in this thesis. In addition, some of 
the most viable future developments were also reviewed in this thesis, most notably the 
new automatic fault isolation and restoration feature. Hence, a couple of solutions for 
the customers’ needs were presented in this thesis but a lot of work still remain to be 
done to offer the best possible tools for fault management. 
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APPENDIX A: THE BASIC STRUCTURE FOR THE CUSTOMER 
INTERVIEWS 
This is the basic structure used in the customer interviews. First, feedback is requested, 
regarding the results of the fault simulations and then some background about the DSOs 
environment is discussed. In the main part, fault management has been generally divid-
ed into three categories; single fault situation, multiple fault situation and a major power 
disruption. For each situation, the fault management processes and development needs 
are discussed separately. However, this structure only forms the basis for the conversa-
tion and other fault management related matters were also discussed, if considered nec-
essary.   
Results of the fault simulations 
• Based on your experience and intuition, do the results and conclusions presented 
in the material seem reasonable/reliable? For example does the used fault current 
information seem correct? What about the estimations of fault isolation times 
and KAH-reductions? 
• Is it OK to include the data in the public part of this thesis? If there is anything 
that should be considered confidential, please point it out. 
Background: Network supervision and operation 
• How extensively are remote-controllable switches currently available in your 
network (e.g. how many RCDs per kilometer of network or feeder) and how do 
you estimate the situation in the future (trend)? 
• Do you have fault indicators installed in your network? If yes, then what is the 
extent of their availability (e.g. amount of fault indicators per kilometer of net-
work) and how do you estimate the situation in the future (trend)? 
• What is your opinion on automatic experimental switchings (e.g. do you see any 
electrical safety related issues that would prevent the use of such automation in 
your network?). Please justify. 
Fault management in different fault situations 
• In this thesis, fault situations have been classified into three categories that are 
presented below. Does this classification seem reasonable to you/is similar clas-
sification used in your company? 
o If not, please describe why and what kind of classification would be bet-
ter/what kind of classification is used in your company. 
• Single fault situation/normal situation 
o How many operators are working in the NCC (in a normal situation)? 
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o Please describe the progress of LV- and MV-fault management processes 
in your company and also try to emphasize the role of DMS600 in each 
phase of the process. What DMS functionalities do you consider most 
important in fault management? 
o Please describe the development needs for the current features of 
DMS600, reflecting to each phase of the fault management process. (If 
there are any) 
o What kind of new functions would you consider necessary or helpful in a 
normal/single fault situation? 
• Multiple faults 
o Is the fault management process somehow different from the previous 
situation? If it is, then 
▪ What criteria is used to shift the organization to a different state? 
(e.g. amount of faults/unsupplied customers/something else) 
▪ Who makes the decision? 
▪ Please describe the fault management process briefly, emphasiz-
ing those phases that differ from the previous situation. (e.g. is 
the amount of personnel different in the NCC/do the responsibili-
ties change/what is done differently). Again, please emphasize 
the role of DMS600 in the process. 
▪ Please describe the development needs for the current features of 
DMS600, reflecting to the fault management process in a multi-
ple fault situation (if there are any) 
▪ What kind of new functions would you consider necessary or 
helpful in a multiple fault situation? 
• Major power disruption 
o How does the fault management process change from the two previous 
situations?  
▪ What criteria is used to shift the organization into a major power 
disruption state? (e.g. amount of faults/unsupplied custom-
ers/something else) 
▪ Who makes the decision? 
▪ Please describe the fault management process briefly, emphasiz-
ing those phases that are different from the two previous situa-
tions. (e.g. the amount of personnel in the 
NCC/responsibilities/what is done differently). Again, please 
emphasize the role of DMS600 in a major power disruption. 
▪ Please describe the development needs for the current features of 
DMS600 in a major power disruption. 
▪ What kind of new functions would you consider necessary or 
helpful during a major power disruption? 
 
